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 Executive Summary 
 
a) UK population growth over the last thirty-five years has been remarkably low in 
comparison with other countries; the population grew by just 7% between 1971 and 2004, 
less than all the other EU15 countries (except Germany), Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and the United States, plus China and India.  The rate of UK population growth 
did exceed that of six countries from the former Soviet bloc (Czech Republic; Croatia; 
Estonia; Hungary; Latvia and Bulgaria), but was below the rates of growth of Poland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
b) The UK population has grown at a faster pace since the turn of the millennium. This 
recent growth has been driven primarily by changes in net migration.  Both the inflow 
and outflow rates have risen, but the inflow rate has risen more rapidly recently, with an 
influx of migrants from eight East European (A8) countries.  However, the increase in the 
net migration flow predates the influx of A8 migrants, reflecting a steady rise in the 
number of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East too.  
 
c) The propensity to migrate to the UK is higher the lower is GDP per capita in each of 
the A8 countries.  The decision is also strongly correlated with life satisfaction scores and 
unemployment rates, but is uncorrelated with employment rates or rates of inflation.   
 
d) There appears to be consistent evidence from the Worker Registration Scheme and 
National Insurance Number applications that approximately 500,000 migrants from the 
A8 countries had come to work in the UK between May 2004 and late 2006.  But other 
sources suggest a significant proportion of these workers have likely returned to their 
country of origin.   
 
e) The empirical literature from around the world suggests little or no evidence that 
immigrants have had a major impact on native labour market outcomes such as wages 
and unemployment.  Recent work by a number of other authors for the UK is also 
consistent with this view. 
 
(f)  The impact of recent migration from the A8 countries on the UK economy will be 
determined by the extent to which immigrants add to supply relative to demand, since it 
is the balance between these two factors that determines prospects for inflation.  We 
argue that, at present, it appears that A8 immigration has tended to increase supply by 
more than it has increased demand in the UK (in the short run), and thereby acted to 
reduce inflationary pressures. 
 
(g)  There seems to be broad agreement that immigration is likely to have reduced the 
natural rate of unemployment in the UK over the past few years.  But there is some 
uncertainty about what has happened to the natural rate in the very recent past and what 
might happen to it in the near future.  This is because immigration has not been the only 




The recent rise in migration to the UK from eight EU Accession countries (the Czech 
Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Slovakia; and Slovenia – the A8 
countries) has generated a good deal of controversy.  How many A8 immigrants are there 
in the UK?  Where did they come from and when?  What impact has their influx had on 
the UK economy and what likely impacts will they have in the future?  Most importantly 
for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), what macroeconomic effects have they had?   
 
We attempt to address these questions here.  First, we examine the change in population 
in the UK over the last thirty-five years and note that growth is very low by international 
standards.  The UK population has, however, grown at a faster pace since the turn of the 
millennium, driven most recently by migration from the A8 nations.  It appears that the 
propensity to migrate to the UK from these countries is higher the lower is GDP per 
capita.  Second, we examine the various sources of data that are available on the numbers 
of A8 immigrants that have arrived in the UK in recent years.  There is broad agreement 
from the various data sources on the numbers involved – half a million workers is likely 
to be an upper bound for the stock of A8 migrants who are in the UK in late 2006.  Many 
of the new 'migrants' may have stayed for only a short time and then returned home, to 
possibly return again at a later date.  Third, we examine the characteristics of the recent 
flow of individuals from the A8 countries that have arrived in the UK since accession, 
and find that they are relatively young, male, have low unemployment rates, lower wages, 
and high self-employment rates and are especially likely to be in temporary jobs.  Finally, 
we turn to the macroeconomic implications of A8 migration to the UK, and argue that 
this immigration has made the labour market more flexible and likely lowered the natural 
rate of unemployment and the NAIRU.  
 
1) Population changes 
 
According to official estimates published by the Office for National Statistics, the UK 
population grew by just 8.2% between 1971 and 2006, from 55.9 million to 60.5 million.  
In contrast, the United States population grew by 44.6% over the same period, from 207.7 
million in 1971 to 300.3 million in 2006.
2  Indeed population growth across many 
countries has been greater than in the UK over the past three decades (Chart 1).  Over the 
period 1971-2004, population growth in the UK ranks 31
st out of 38 European and other 
large nations for which data are available (listed in Table 1, excluding Romania), with 
only Germany (East and West) and six East European countries having had slower 
population growth (Czech Republic; Croatia; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia and Bulgaria).  
All the other major industrialised nations have had faster rates of population growth.  
Growth was particularly rapid in the US (+42%) as noted above, but also in Australia 
(+54%); Canada (+45%); Spain (+25%); Japan (+21%); and France (+18%).  The Indian 
population roughly doubled over the same period (96%), while the Chinese population 
grew by 52%.  It is clear that UK population growth has been extremely low by 
international standards – it is even below that of Italy (+7.6%).   
                                                 




Chart 1: Population growth, 1971-2004   Chart 2: Annual UK population growth, 
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1971-2004
 
Source: Eurostat, US Statistical Abstract 2006 and Health 
Statistics Quarterly, 32, Winter 2006 
 
1. The chart shows the ordering of population growth between 



















































1. Official disaggregated data are not yet available for 2006.  
 
Long-run trends, however, mask some significant short-run changes in population growth 
(Chart 2 & Table 2a).  The UK population grew by 2.8 million (4.9%) between 1971 and 
1999, but the population has subsequently risen by a further 1.8 million (3.2%).  The 
main cause of this increase has been a rise in net inward migration, driven by an increase 
in the inflow rate to the UK; the outflow rate has remained little changed over the years, 
although there has been a pickup since 1998. The ratio of births to deaths has seen less 
variation. In 2004-5 net migration accounted for two-thirds of the change in population 
(248/375).  To place these numbers in some degree of context, net (legal) migration in the 
United States accounted for approximately one third of net population growth in 2004-
2005.
3  Table 2b makes it clear that the scale of net inward migration to the UK has been 
much lower than in most other EU countries until recently, and even now remains below 
the levels of both Italy and Spain.  
In summary, UK population growth appears to have been extremely low by international 
standards over the past three decades.  As such, it would seem likely that the UK could 
absorb a relatively small inflow of immigrants, by international standards.  As we note 
below, it appears that it has already done so to a considerable degree; the entry of recent 
A8 migrants appears to have improved the workings of the labour market, reduced wage 




                                                 
3 Population in the United States on July 1
st 2004 was 293,657,000 increasing to 296,410,000 on July 1
st 
2005 a net increase of 2,754,000 or 0.94%.  This increase was made up of 4,129,000 births, 2,425,000 
deaths and net legal migration of 1,050,000. Source: US Census Bureau - 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/07s0004.xls    
3 
2) Why has immigration to the UK increased since the turn of the millennium? 
 
The increase in net migration coincides with changes in UK immigration policy and the 
relative attractiveness of the UK’s economic position over the past decade.  Most 
recently, the increase in the inflow rate of migrants appears in large part to be attributable 
to immigration policy that accompanied the accession of the A8 countries on May 1
st 
2004;
4 citizens from the A8 nations obtained free movement and the right to work in the 
UK, Ireland and Sweden from this date.
5  But there has continued to be a steady growth 
in the inflow of migrants to the UK from non-A8 countries too, especially from the New 
Commonwealth. 
 
The literature on immigration focuses on the economic factors that determine migration.  
Very simply, the literature says that individuals will compare the income benefits from 
migration with the economic and social costs of moving.  If the benefits outweigh the 
costs, they may choose to migrate.  The gain from moving will be calculated as the 
expected income differential between the destination country and the country of origin, 
which will in turn be determined by the relative probability of getting a job – captured by 
differences in the unemployment or employment rates.   
 
Naskoteen and Zimmer (1980) find for the US that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
wage differential between the countries of destination and origin increases the probability 
of migration by 7 percentage points.  Borjas (2005) finds that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the rate of employment growth in the state of origin reduces the probability of 
migration by approximately 2 percent.  There is also evidence that migration is most 
common among younger and more educated workers (Borjas 2005).  Moreover, workers 
who have just migrated are extremely likely to move back to their original locations.  The 
probability of a migrant returning to the state of origin within a year is about 13 per cent 
and the probability of moving to another location is 15 per cent (Devanzo, 1983 and 
Dustmann, 2003). Zaiceva (2006) summarises the empirical literature on the potential 
migration flows, which he shows to be consistent with between 2 and 4 per cent of the 
residents of Central and East European countries (CEECS) moving West, in the long run, 
which constitutes around 1 per cent of the EU15 population.   Zaiceva also presents 
evidence from simulations suggesting that the majority of migrants are predicted to come 
from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, which is consistent with other estimates from the 
literature. 
 
Gilpin et al (2006) examine whether A8 citizens have come to the UK because it offers a 
higher standard of living (GDP per capita) or a higher probability of getting a job 
(measured by the inverse of the unemployment rate), or both.  They consider data from 
the Worker Registration Scheme (see Appendix A for more details on this data source).  
                                                 
4 In addition Malta and (South) Cyprus also joined the EU at that date.  Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
EU on January 1
st 2007. 
 
5 Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain opened their labour markets to these workers on May 1
st 2006, while 
Italy followed in late July 2006.  Five other countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) alleviated restrictions in 2006 (Zaiceva, 2006). 
  
4 
They compute the number of WRS registrations as a percentage of the home country 
population and show it is correlated with GDP and unemployment.  We update their 
analysis in Table A. It is apparent that a larger fraction of people of Lithuania (1.60%); 
Latvia (1.25%); Slovakia (0.92%) and Poland (0.79%) have come to the UK compared to 
Estonia (0.42%), the Czech Republic (0.24), Hungary (0.14) and Slovenia (0.02) (Table 
A).  Gilpin et al. find that countries with the lowest GDP per head, such as Lithuania 
(2500 Euros) are more likely to be registered on the UK WRS than those from countries 
with higher GDP, such as Slovenia (11,400 Euros).
6  Workers in the WRS data are also 
more likely to come from countries with the highest unemployment rates, such as Poland 
(19.0%).  Pedersen et al (2004) found similar effects for GDP per capita and the 
unemployment rate in both source and destination countries in their study of migration 
flows into OECD countries in the 1990s. 
 














rate          
(2004)
Employment 
rate        
(2004)
GDP per head 
(2005) (Euros per 
head at 1995 
exchanges rates and 
Czech Republic 0.24 24.7 10.2 8.3 64.2 5,200 €
Estonia 0.42 5.5 1.3 9.7 63.0 4,000 €
Hungary 0.14 14.6 10.1 6.1 56.8 5,000 €
Latvia 1.25 28.9 2.3 10.4 62.3 3,100 €
Lithuania 1.60 54.6 3.4 11.4 61.2 2,500 €
Poland 0.79 307.6 38.6 19.0 51.7 4,200 €
Slovakia 0.92 50.2 5.4 18.2 57.0 4,200 €
Slovenia 0.02 0.5 2.0 6.3 65.3 11,400 €
Average/Total 0.66 486.6 73.3
UK 59.5 4.7 71.6
EU-25 458.9 9.1 63.3
Correlation 0.508 -0.198 -0.709                              
 
Source: Gilpin Table 4.3 updated. Human Development Report, 2006.  
 
The correlation coefficient is clearly highest with 2005 GDP per head, as noted by Gilpin 
et al., and even higher when GDP is in logs (r=0.837).  The correlation is slightly weaker 
with the unemployment rate, but especially low with the employment rate.
7   
Interestingly, Schiopu and Siegfried (2006) found that the difference in GDP between the 
host and home countries increases the size of remittances. 
 
Data are also available on the country’s rank on the 2005 Human Development Index 
taken from the Human Development Report of the UN, and their average life satisfaction 
                                                 
6 Expressed as Euros per inhabitant at 1995 exchange rates and prices. 
 
7 The correlation with the CPI is only -0.166, also drawn from the HDR 2006, Table 14. 
  
5 
score for 2002 taken from the Eurobarometer Surveys.
8  A lower rank on HDI is better, a 
higher life satisfaction score is better. The propensity to migrate is even more highly 
correlated with these two measures than it is with GDP per capita (Table B).
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GDP per capita 




Czech Republic 30 75.7 81 $19,408 2.82
Estonia 40 71.6 92 $14,555 2.55
Hungary 35 73.0 87 $16,814 2.60
Latvia 45 71.8 90 $11,653 2.46
Lithuania 41 72.5 92 $13,107 2.44
Poland 37 74.6 86 $12,974 2.69
Slovakia 42 74.3 77 $14,623 2.56
Slovenia 27 76.6 95 $20,939 3.05
Romania 60 71.5 75 $8,480 2.39
Bulgaria 54 72.4 81 $8,078 2.02
UK 18 78.5 93 $30,821 3.17
Correlation 0.797 -0.526 -0.005 -0.823 -0.751  
 
Source: Human Development Report 2006 & Eurobarometer 
 
We explored the correlations with each of the components of the HDI, which includes the 
life expectancy rate (r=-0.526); the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, 
secondary and tertiary schools (r=-0.005); and GDP per capita (PPP US$) for 2004, 
which has an even better correlation (r=-0.823) than the GDP data used by Gilpin et al, 
and in logs the correlation is -0.836.  It is already well-known that East Europeans are 
more likely to report that they are unhappy (Blanchflower, 2000 and Blanchflower and 
Freeman 1999).  In a recent Candidate Eurobarometer collected between September and 
October, 2002 (ICPSR #4062) respondents were asked the following question.  
 
Q.  On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the life you lead? A. Very satisfied=4; Fairly satisfied=3; Not very 
satisfied=2; Not at all satisfied=1 
 
                                                 
8 The HDI is published annually by the United Nations and is a score that amalgamates three indicators: 
lifespan; educational attainment and adjusted real income (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005). 
 
9 The correlation is similar with the 2001 life satisfaction score (-0.72), but lower in 2003 (-0.55), 2004 (-
0.57) and 2005 (-0.58)  
6 
The means of the life satisfaction score variable correlate reasonably well with the 
propensity to migrate (r=-0.751) and considerably better than the unemployment or 
employment rates. 
   
In summary, the favourable macroeconomic climate (low unemployment) and high 
standard of living in the UK (GDP per capita) are reasons why immigrants from the A8 
countries may have been attracted to the UK, and why immigrants from Bulgaria and 
Romania may be attracted in the future.  The OECD has recently (2006b) projected that 
GDP will grow particularly quickly in both Poland and Slovakia over the next couple of 
years.  The OECD projects a growth rate of around 8% in both 2006 and 2007 in 
Slovakia, and 5% in Poland, where, it suggests remittances from migrants will sustain 
consumption. The other member of the OECD is Hungary, which is projected to grow at 
4% in 2006, but only at 2% in 2007. Rapid GDP growth in some A8 countries and 
improvements in their unemployment rates might suggest a reduction in the flows of both 
permanent migrants and especially temporary workers to the UK from the A8 countries in 
the near future.  Pedersen et al (2004) studied migration flows into 27 OECD countries 
from 1990-2000 and found that network effects, measured as the coefficient of the stock 
of immigrants of own national background already resident in a country, had a large 
positive impact on immigration flows.  This suggests that rather than dissipate, the flows 
may well continue well into the future although the scale of the flow remains uncertain.  
Further the Bank’s regional Agents have undertaken a survey of business contacts 
concerning their use of migrant labour that suggested that a majority of firms were 
expecting to make greater use of such labour into the future. 
 
3) Size of migration flows from the A8 
 
It is difficult to get an exact estimate of the size of the flows of individuals from the A8 
countries to the UK since accession.  Some estimates suggest that around 500,000 A8 
workers have come to the UK, but other sources suggest many fewer. It is also unclear 
what proportion of such workers are long-term migrants and what proportion are here for 
a short time and have  subsequently returned home, perhaps to return again in the future.  
The scale and nature of this flow is an important question for policy makers because it 
affects the labour market and the wider economy.  It is therefore important to try and 
understand and reconcile the differences between different data sources as far as possible.  
Doing this, we find that 500,000 workers is an upper bound for the stock of post-
accession A8 workers in the UK in late 2006.   
 
There are four main sources of data on the flow of A8 individuals.  Further details of the 
sources are provided in Appendix A.  We examine estimates of the numbers using each 
data series in turn. 
 
1) Worker Registration Scheme 
Table 3 reports the number of workers, by A8 country, who registered, and were 
approved for work, on the WRS – a registration scheme for employees from the A8 
countries.  The self-employed do not need to register under the WRS.  The largest 
number in every year has come from Poland.  Between 2004Q2 and 2006Q3 over 
300,000 Poles had registered, which constitutes 63% of the total.  The next largest group 
(11%) is from Lithuania, which had only 3.4 million residents in 2004, compared with  
7 
38.2 million in Poland.
10  The flows by quarter are very similar.  The WRS suggests that 
486,660 workers had registered to work in the UK since accession – a further 3,895 were 
refused, 1,035 were exempt and 14,950 applications were withdrawn making a grand 
total of 510,340 applicants.  The three main countries from which migrants have come 
are Poland (63%); Lithuania (11%); and Slovakia (10%). 
 
Ireland has been the other major recipient of migrant flows from the A8.  According to 
Ireland’s National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS), over the first twelve 
months to April 2005, 83,000 Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSN) were issued to 
EU10 nationals, which is equivalent to almost 4% of Ireland’s labour force. Some of 
these people were, however, already in Ireland prior to May 2004. Another 66,000 PPSNs 
were issued in the six months from May to October 2005, an increase of 46% on the same 
period for the previous year.  The OECD (2006a) suggests that the country composition 
of A8 workers to Ireland is similar to that of the UK - Poland (54%), Lithuania (19%), 
Latvia (9%), and Slovakia (8%).
11   
 
2) Total International Migration, predominantly from the International Passenger Survey  
Table 4 provides official estimates of migration based on the International Passenger 
Survey (IPS), showing changes in the inflow and outflow rates of 'long-term international 
migrants' – a migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence for at 
least 12 months.
12  It is apparent that both have risen steadily since 2002, although the 
inflow rate has experienced the more rapid rise. Table 4 suggests that there was a net 
positive migration flow of 223,000 in 2004 and a further 185,000 in 2005, making a total 
of 408,000.   As part of these, the IPS suggests that 132,000 individuals have come to the 
UK from the A8 countries, which is a considerably lower number than from the WRS, 
why?    
 
Some concerns have been expressed about the accuracy of the data from this source as it 
covers only the principal air and sea routes, and the Channel Tunnel.  There is evidence 
of an increase in the number of passenger journeys terminating at airports not routinely 
covered by the IPS – ie to terminals outside of Gatwick, Heathrow and Manchester – 
particularly to and from Poland (having increased from 516,000 in 2003 to 1,845,000 in 
2005) – so some migrants may have been missed.
13,14  Furthermore, many of these extra 
journeys appear to have resulted from an increase in short-term visits to the UK – those 
of less than three months.  Table C shows that there has been a steady increase in the 
                                                 
10 Source: Eurostat. 
 
11 OECD (2006, Table 1.22) suggests that the other major recipient countries other than Ireland and the UK 
have been Italy (84,000); Norway (36,000) and the USA (21,000). 
 
12 This is the UN-recommended definition of a migrant.  See ONS (2006a). 
 
13 See www.caa.co.uk for airline statistics on passenger journeys in and out of the UK. 
 
14 There have also been notable increases in the number of passenger journeys to and from Slovakia (from 
29,000 to 284,000) and to and from Latvia (from 61,000 to 309,000), again with the vast majority of the 
increases being to airports other than Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester, not routinely covered by the IPS.   
  
8 
number of travellers from the A8 to the UK, consistent with the flights data.
15  According 
to the ONS, 89% of A8 travellers who came to the UK in 2006, said they intended to stay 
less than 3 months.
16  The exclusion of these short-term visitors from the count of 'long-
term international migrants' may account for the lower estimate of the number of A8 
migrants in the IPS than observed in the WRS. 
 
Table C: Visits to the United Kingdom 
 
(000s) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU25 13,463 14,113 15,953 17,159 18,299
EU15 12,837 13,346 14,522 14,945 15,231
A8 549 677 1,334 2,104 2,961
Poland 210 278 646 1,153 1,721  
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
3) National Insurance Numbers (NINos) 
Table 5 shows that there has been a sharp rise in the number of A8 individuals that have 
requested National Insurance numbers – up from 12,000 in 2002/03 to 270,000 in 
2005/06.
17  Between April 2004 and March 2006, approximately 380,000 individuals 
from the A8 countries had registered for a National Insurance number.  This estimate is 
more similar to the WRS than the IPS, and the difference appears to reflect the different 
time period covered and the inclusion of self-employed workers in the NINo data.   
 
4) Labour Force Survey 
It is feasible to obtain estimates of the number of A8 migrants resident in the UK using 
population weighted LFS micro-data.  To the extent that these population weights 
undercount the number of migrants then this would be a source of bias.  Results are 
reported in Table D. 
 
Table D: LFS estimates of the stock of A8 migrants in the UK 
All A8 migrants 








Summer 2003 110,000 40,000 9,000 (36.4) (22.5)
Summer 2004 165,000 90,000 26,500 (54.5) (29.4)
Summer 2005 245,000 175,000 26,000 (71.4) (14.9)
Summer 2006 350,000 260,000 28,000 (74.3) (10.8)
Q3 2006 375,000 268,000 25,000 (71.5) (9.3)
Employed
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 
 
                                                 
15 www.statistics.gov/downloads/theme_transport/Visits_to_UK_Sep06.pdf  
 
16  Although intentions may not equate to actual outcomes.   
 
17 Source: DWP (2006) 
  
9 
Here we define an A8 migrant based on country of birth; it is possible to use country of 
origin, but the results are the same.  Column 1 replicates the numbers in Gilpin et al 
(2006) for the years 2003-2005 and updates them to 2006 based on Summer quarters in 
each year (June, July and August).  Data for 2006Q3 (July, August, and September) are 
also presented.  Around 350,000 nationals from the A8 countries were resident in the UK 
by the Summer of 2006, according to the LFS data, of whom 240,000 had arrived since 
2004; nearly 85% were workers (220,000).  Over time the proportion of A8 migrants who 
are workers has risen from 36% to 74%.  Somewhat surprisingly, there has been little 
change in the number who claim to be self-employed since 2004.  The LFS data also 
suggest that 20% of all migrants that arrived in the UK between 2004 and 2006Q3 were 
Polish, and roughly a third were from the A8 as a whole.   
 
Reconciling the differences 
 
The number of A8 migrants entering the UK since Accession appears quite uncertain 
given the available data.  But the different sources vary in their coverage, both in terms of 
the migrants captured (including definitional differences) and the period of observation.  
Table E attempts to accommodate the latter issue, adjusting the NINo and TIM (IPS) 
numbers such that they – like the LFS and WRS data – also cover the period since 
Accession.  Following adjustment, the number of NINo applications and number of WRS 
applicants are comparable at around 500,000.  The LFS and TIM (IPS) data are much 
lower than these, but again comparable with one another.  The remaining differences 
between the estimates reflect the groups of individuals covered and definitions employed.  
The LFS and TIM data are designed to capture only those migrants who stay in the 
country for an extended period of time – more than 6 months for the LFS and 12 months 
for the IPS.  In contrast, the NINo and WRS capture all migrants, including those that 
might return home relatively quickly – or in some sense commute to the UK for work.  
 
The broader ordering of the estimates also makes sense.  The LFS micro-data suggest that 
30,000 self-employed workers have come to the UK since Accession.  This equates to the 
gap between the adjusted number of NINo applications, which covers all workers, and 
the number of WRS applicants, which are solely employees.  In addition, we should also 
expect the estimated number of A8 migrants from the LFS data to exceed the estimate 
from the TIM(IPS), because the TIM(IPS) employs a more restrictive definition of a 
migrant – a migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence for a 
period of at least a year.  
 
Having reconciled the differences as far as possible, it appears that 500,000 workers is 
likely to be an upper estimate of the number of A8 migrants that could potentially be in 
the UK in late 2006.  The data also suggest that as many as half of the migrants that have 















to cover period 
since Accession
NINo registrations 382,100
Those registering for 
tax or benefit purposes
Apr. 2004 - 
Mar. 2006 515,000
WRS 486,660 Employed workers
May 2004 - 
Sept. 2006 486,660
LFS 265,000 All those aged 16-64
May 2004 - 
Sept. 2006 265,000
TIM (based on IPS) 132,000 All long-term migrants
Jan. 2004 - 
Dec. 2005 215,000  
 
Source: DWP, Home Office, ONS and own estimates 
 
1. The LFS numbers are different from those described earlier because they cover a different period and different group (those aged 
16-64 versus 16+) of migrants.        
 
It does seem that the extent of mis-measurement of the number of foreign workers from 
the A8 is unlikely to have had any significant impact on the current measurement of the 
ILO unemployment rate, or the claimant count, as the numbers of additional migrants 




There is another source of data on international migration that supports our findings.  
Population data recently available from Eurostat (2006) suggest that there was no 
substantial decline in the populations of any of the A8 countries, especially Poland, 
between 2004 and 2005.  As a proportion of the population, the greatest net outflows 
have been from Lithuania (-0.60%) and Latvia (-0.55%).  This is consistent with the 
flows to the UK from the A8 being largely temporary in nature.  The small emigration 
numbers for the earliest period following accession are also consistent with that view, 








                                                 
18 Currently at the time of writing (December, 2006) there are 30,696,000 economically active and 
1,711,000 unemployed giving an unemployment rate of 1,711/30,696=5.57%.  For simplicity, let us assume 
that there were actually 304,000 more, uncounted, employed migrants, without adding anything to the 
unemployment numbers as few if any of them are unemployed anyway.  Such an increase would only lower 
the unemployment rate to (1,711/31,000)=5.52%.  It seems implausible to believe that there is greater mis-
measurement than this.  To return the unemployment rate to its October 2005 level of 5.12% (1,554/30,312) 
would require an increase in the workforce to 33,400,000, an increase of around three quarters of a million 
uncounted workers, which seems unlikely. 
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Table F: Other sources of data on migration flows  
 
2004 2005 # change % change Emigration
(000s) (000s) (000s) 2004 (000s)
EU-25 457,189 459,488 2,299 0.50%  n/a
EU-15 383,047 385,383 2,336 0.61%  n/a
Czech Republic 10,212 10,221 9 0.09% 34.8
Estonia 1,351 1,347 -4 -0.30% n/a
Hungary 10,117 10,098 -9 -0.01% 3.1
Latvia 2,319 2,306 -13 -0.55% 2.7
Lithuania 3,446 3,425 -21 -0.60% 15.2
Poland    . 38,191 38,174 -17 -0.04% 18.9
Slovenia 1,996 1,998 1 0.06%
Slovakia 5,380 5,385 5 0.09% 8.3
Bulgaria 7,801 7,761 -40 -0.52% 1.6
Croatia 4,442 4,444 2 0.05%   n/a
Romania 21,711 21,659 -53 -0.24%   n/a
UK 59,700 60,035 335 0.56% 310.4  
Source: Eurostat (Tables C.1 & F.3) 
 
4) Characteristics of new migrants 
 
It is possible to use the various data sources described above to determine the 
characteristics of new (defined here as post-2004, and used interchangeably with ‘recent’) 
A8 migrants and how they compare with new migrants from non-A8 countries, older 
migrants who arrived pre-2004, as well as the non-migrant population or natives. 
 
a) Region 
Table 6 shows the number of worker applications from the WRS that were approved by 
region, with the largest numbers in the East of England followed by London.  Also 
included in the final column of the table is the regional distribution of the unemployment 
increase of 263,000 that occurred over the twelve months to September 2006. The 
correlation between the distribution of migrants and growth in unemployment is 
relatively weak. 
 
Table 7 shows the distribution of all migrants by region using data on National Insurance 
numbers.  The table presents numbers registering in 2002-03 and 2005-06 as well as the 
overall distribution of the migrants themselves alongside the distribution of the 16+ 
population.  The next to last column reports the number of migrants registering in 2005-
06 as a proportion of the 16+ population in 2006Q2.  As was the case with the WRS, the 
distribution of migrants is only weakly related to the change in unemployment observed 
over the last year and reported in the final column of the table.   It is apparent that 
registrations of new migrants have increased in all regions, although the numbers are 
especially high in London and the South East.  London and the South East account for 
approximately 48% of registrations for National Insurance numbers, but only 26% of the  
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16+ population.  Table 8a uses regression estimation techniques and the LFS micro-data 
to confirm the importance of migrants in London and the South East.  
 
It appears that the effects of A8 immigration would likely be felt most in the South East 
and least in the rest of the country.  The question down the road is whether future waves 
of immigrants will move outside London, to areas, such as Scotland, which have lower 
unemployment and a declining and aging population.
19   
 
b) Occupation 
Table 9 reports the distribution of A8 migrants by the top twenty occupations over time 
from the WRS.  The largest occupation is Process operative (Other Factory Worker).  As 
noted by Saleheen and Shadforth (2006), the dominant occupations are less skilled.   
Interestingly, though, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of A8 
workers in the WRS classified as being in Administration, Business and Management.  
The majority of workers in the Administration, Business & Management occupation 
group work for recruitment agencies and could be employed in a variety of occupations, 
and on a temporary basis.  In 2004 (May-December), 24.8% of registered workers were 
in this category, compared with 36.3% in 2005 and 34.8% in the first three quarters of 
2006.  Consistent with this finding, Table 8b suggests that approximately one in five new 
A8 immigrants are in temporary jobs.   
 
c) Industry 
From Table 8b it is apparent that the A8 migrants are more likely to be migrants in 
Manufacturing, Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants and Construction than non-A8 
migrants or natives.  Non-A8 migrants are more likely to be in the public sector – 
especially as nurses and carers - confirmed by work permits data (Table 10). 
 
d) Schooling 
Table 8a suggests that a high proportion of the new A8 migrants have a qualification, 
confirming the findings in Saleheen and Shadforth (2006).  The LFS classifies foreign 
qualifications simply as ‘other’, so the level of these qualifications remains unclear. 
 
e) Age and gender 
The proportion of workers who register on the WRS who are young is particularly high 
and has changed little over time.  Of those who applied between May 2004 and 
September 2006, 82% were aged 18-34 and 43% were aged 18-24.   The male: female 
ratio was 58:42.  Confirming the evidence in the WRS that A8 migrants are 
disproportionately young and male, 36.3% of applicants for NINos were aged 18-24 in 
2005/6, and 44.9% were aged 25-34.  The male: female ratio was 54:46. Saleheen and 
Shadforth (2006) found from the 2005 LFS that recent A8 immigrants are also younger, 
more likely to be male and single than other recent immigrants or than the indigenous 
population.  Drinkwater et al (2006) found similar results.  This is confirmed in the more 
recent data used here which pools 2004-2006Q3 to ensure larger sample sizes.  A8 
immigrants were on average 28 years of age compared with 30 years for recent non-A8 
                                                 
19 See Bell and Blanchflower (2007) 
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immigrants (Table 8a).  They were also disproportionately male (59.1% for A8s and 
48.4% non-A8s) and single (54.2% for A8s and 51.4% for non-A8s).   
 
These data fit with other information available from a Candidate Eurobarometer Survey 
conducted by the European Commission in April 2001, which considered the migration 
intentions of A10 (A8 plus Cyprus and Malta) residents well before the borders opened in 
May 2004.  Respondents in the A10, plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, were asked “do 
you intend to go and live and work – for a few months or several years – in a current EU 
country in the next five years?”.
20  Obviously, one cannot assume that everyone who 
expresses an interest in migration will actually migrate, but it turns out that there are 
patterns in the data consistent with the actual flows to the UK.  Table 11 reports the 
results of estimating the probability of an individual responding in the affirmative to the 
above question.
21  Column 1 includes controls for age, gender, schooling, labour market 
status and marital status and country dummies, with the excluded country being Malta.  
Probabilities of ‘intending to move’ were especially high in Lithuania and Poland, which, 
as we noted above, have been the two main source countries of A8 workers to the UK.  
Column 1 suggests that intentions to move were higher for men, the young, the most 
educated, unmarried or divorced, the unemployed, students and professionals.   
 
Respondents in the survey were also asked “how willing would you be to live in another 
European country where the language is different from your mother tongue?”  Possible 
answers were ‘not at all; not much; to some extent; very much’.  Column 2 reports the 
results of estimating an ordered logit where the dependent variable is set to one if not at 
all, 2=not much etc. with the same controls as in column 1.  The patterns revealed in 
column 2 are very similar to those in column 1 – the probability of being willing to move 
is higher among the young; men; the unmarried and divorced; the most educated; 
professionals and business proprietors; those from Latvia and Poland, but also now 
Slovakia.  These equations seem highly consistent with the characteristics of the migrants 
outlined above – intentions appear to be highly correlated with subsequent actions. 
 
Interestingly, the World Bank (2007) addressed the issue of the mobility of the young in 
its recent World Development Report.  They found that the propensity to migrate 
increases over the teenage years peaking in the early twenties in many destination 
countries, such as Spain and the United States.  Hence, young people make up a higher 
proportion of the flow of international migrants than the stock. Young people are likely to 
face lower costs of moving and have higher lifetime returns.  The World Bank notes that 
when the only legal options for the young are through high-skilled immigration, 
categories requiring tertiary education or substantial job experience, migrants are less 
likely to be young.  They also conducted a survey of youths aged 15-24 in seven 
developing countries (Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Iraq, Malaysia, Romania and 
                                                 
20 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer #2002.1 March-April 2002 ZA No. 4153.  For details see 
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/cceb/index.htm .  See also Krieger (2004). 
 
21 A dprobit is estimated in STATA and reports the marginal effect, that is the change in the probability for 
an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, reports the discrete 
change in the probability for dummy variables.  
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Tajikistan) and asked “if it were possible for you legally to move to another country to 
work would you?”  Data are presented in Table G.
22 
 
Table G: “If it were possible for you legally to move to another country to work 
would you?”  
 
Move permanently Move temporarily Try it out Not move
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Albanian Males 23 39 30 8
Albanian Females 21 40 30 9
Bangladeshi Males 3 70 20 7
Bangladeshi Females 3 44 17 36
Ethiopian Males 7 59 7 24
Ethiopian Females 12 51 13 17
Iraqi Males 21 32 28 20
Iraqi Females 16 28 27 29
Malaysian Males 3 18 42 38
Malaysian Females 2 20 30 48
Romanian Males 21 58 12 9
Romanian Females 11 58 16 15
Tajik Males 7 60 15 18
Tajik Females 6 26 9 59
 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
 
Very high proportions said they would like to move, especially in Romania and Albania, 
but the vast majority of those who wanted to move expressed a desire to migrate for only 
a short period allowing them to save money to buy a house, open a business, or achieve 
other goals in their home countries (World Bank (2007) chapter 8 figure 8.5).
23   
 
There is other evidence suggesting that there is often significant return migration.  For 
example, LaLonde and Topel (1997) found that 4.8 million of the 15.7 million US 
immigrants who arrived between 1907 and 1957 had departed by the latter year.   
Chiswick and Hatton (2003) pointed out that return migration exceeded immigration to 
the United States during the 1930s.  Yang (2006) recently examined the economics of 
return migration for temporary labour migration by Filipinos.  Yang found that, on 
average, a 10% improvement in the exchange rate reduced the 12-month migrant return 
rate by 1.4 percentage points. This is a large effect, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the 
mean 12-month return rate in his sample.  
 
                                                 
22  We thank David McKenzie at the World Bank for providing us with these data. 
 
23 In both Romania and Albania over 90% of males expressed a desire to move, but only around 20% of the 
total said they wanted to move permanently. 
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f) Unemployment 
There is little or no evidence to suggest that that the new A8 migrants have come to the 
UK to claim or receive benefits: they have come to work.  A8 workers, who are 
registered under the WRS, have a right to reside and are entitled to in-work benefits such 
as housing benefit and council tax benefit.  If they are in part-time work of less than 15 
hours per week they can qualify for Jobseeker's Allowance.  If they lose their job they 
lose their worker status, but are able to remain in the UK to find another job.  However, 
they do not have access to the benefit system, although after 12 months of continuous 
employment they can have access to the full range of benefits.  Once someone has been 
working for 12 months they can apply for a residence permit.  The immigrants from the 
A8 have generally not brought dependents with them, although 56,681 successful claims 
for child benefit have been filed. By 2006Q3, only 353/2328 applications for income 
support; 859/5154 applications for income based jobseekers allowance; 32/125 
applications for state pension credit and 524 applications for homelessness assistance had 
been allowed to proceed.  There have only been 128 local authority lettings to A8 
immigrants in England.
24  However, there is some anecdotal evidence, particularly in 
London, that A8  migrants presenting as homeless has become a significant problem. 
 
As Hillier and Hayes note:  
 
"(I)t is unlikely that large numbers of A8 citizens will uproot themselves 
from their homes, come to the UK to work for at least a year in order to 
secure a future life of state-funded living.  First, there is the effort involved 
in this, and we are presumably talking about people who are not prepared to 
make much effort on most fronts.  Second, there is the standard of living 
involved.  Would life on state benefits in the UK really be that much better 
than life on a low income in Estonia?  Well, it might be.  But probably not 
by enough to make it a worthwhile option for an otherwise idle person if 
they had to work for at least a year – perhaps working on a farm on 
minimum wages – to get it" (2006, p.13). 
 
As we show below, the influx of workers from the A8 appears to have had little or no 
discernible effect on the unemployment rate or any other labour market aggregate for that 
matter.  It is plausible of course, that an influx of immigrants could displace natives or 
less recent immigrants, and this is an issue we discuss further below.  The large literature 
on the issue suggests that this is unlikely to have been very important. 
 
That being said, LFS data in Table 8b suggests that the unemployment rates for recent A8 
immigrants are higher than for natives.  For example, the native unemployment rate for 
men is 5.1%, compared with 6.8% for recent A8 migrants and is even higher for recent 
non-A8 migrants.  The story is similar for females.  As we will show below, the higher 
unemployment rates for A8 migrants arise in large part because of differences in age, 
which need to be controlled for.  
 
                                                 
24 Source: Home Office (2006). 
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Table 12 reports the results of estimating the probability of a randomly selected 
individual being unemployed, conditional on their characteristics, where the dependent 
variable is set to zero if employed and one if unemployed, using data from the LFS.  A 
dprobit is estimated as previously.
21  The data used in the first three columns is for 2004-
2006Q3, while the final column is for 2000-2003, and for both year groupings the sample 
is restricted to those of working age (16-64).  In columns 1-3 an immigration dummy is 
included along with two dummies to identify recent A8 and recent non-A8 immigrants, 
where 'recent' means post-2004.  Two year dummies are also included.  The result from 
Table 8 is replicated here; recent immigrants have higher probabilities of being 
unemployed than natives or immigrants that arrived pre-2004. Adding five age dummies 
in column 2 changes the sign of the A8 since 2004 dummy, and the coefficient is 
significant at conventional levels.  The 'other since 2004' dummy and the immigration 
dummies remain significant and positive.  
 
The main reason for the higher observed rates of unemployment among recent A8 
immigrants in the LFS arises because these migrants are relatively young.  Column three 
of Table 12 adds additional controls for schooling, gender, race and location.  Both the 
immigrant and ‘other since 2004’ dummies are now insignificant, but the 'A8 since 2004' 
remains significant and positive.  Including the immigrant dummy on its own without 
either of the recent immigrant terms results in it being insignificant, which is in direct 
contrast to the findings for the period 2000-2003 when it is significant and positive. The 
equations in columns 3 and 4 are strikingly similar.  Perhaps the most striking differences 
over time are the rise in the size of the Inner London coefficient and the decline in the 
size of the male coefficient, suggesting the gender gap in unemployment has narrowed. 
Probabilities of being unemployed in both year groupings are higher for men, the young, 
blacks and Asians, the least educated and for those living in Tyne and Wear. The positive 
and significant 2006 dummies in columns 1-3 show that unemployment is significantly 
higher in 2006 than it was in 2004.  The significant negative dummies for 2001-2003 
show that unemployment was significantly higher in 2000.  
 
g) Wages 
Table 13 reports the results of estimating five log hourly wage equations using data from 
the 2004-2006 LFS. They follow the same structure as in Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994a, 1994b).  Each equation includes a set of year dummies; race controls are added in 
column 2; schooling dummies in column 3; region of work, workforce size and industry 
dummies in column 4.  Column 5 then adds controls for recent A8 and non-A8 
immigrants.  Adding controls has an impact – some of the difference in wages across 
groups depends on characteristics particularly schooling, region and industry.   
Immigrants earn 5% higher wages than non-immigrants without controls and 3% with 
them.  A8 immigrants earn approximately 14% less (column 4) than non-immigrants.  
Recent A8 immigrants earn 18% less than non-immigrants; 20% less than non-A8 
immigrants, whether recent or not.  Recent A8 immigrants are relatively low paid.
25 
                                                 
25 Drinkwater et al (2006) found from an analysis of wages in the Labour Force Surveys of 2001-2006,  
that Poles had lower rates of return to their human capital than other recent migrants, even after controlling 




It is appropriate to examine the incidence of (self-reported) self-employment among A8 
migrants given that the self-employed do not have to register under the WRS, although 
they do have to apply for a NINo, unless they work illegally in the black economy and 
are paid cash in hand.  Table 14 once again uses the LFS data file for 2004-2006Q3 to 
estimate a dprobit, but here the sample is restricted to workers, with the dependent 
variable set to one if self-employed and zero if a worker.  The results are standard, in that 
the probability of being self-employed is higher for men, Asians and Chinese, rises with 
age and is especially high for those with a trade.
26 It is low for blacks and those under 
eighteen and for those with an HND, teaching or nursing qualification only.  Immigrants 
have a higher probability of being self-employed; A8 immigrants who arrived pre-2004 
have a particularly high probability (column 1), but recent immigrants have lower 
probabilities.  As we move to the right controls are added.  Column 5 adds 21 region of 
work dummies and 60 industry dummies that result in recent non-A8 immigrants having 
lower self-employment rates than natives (1.7 percentage points lower), while pre-2004 
A8 migrants have much higher probabilities (12.0 percentage points higher).  Recent A8 
migrants have significantly higher self-employment rates than natives (5.5 percentage 
points higher than non-immigrants), holding constant characteristics.   
 
Interestingly, a number of recent Flash Eurobarometers have been carried out for a 
number of countries on behalf of the European Commission, over the period 2000-2004, 
on the topic of Entrepreneurship.
27  The list of countries includes the 25 members of the 
EU including the A8 plus the USA, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.    Workers in these 
countries were asked if “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to a lack of 
financial support?”  Table 15 ranks countries according to their answers to this question 
based on the proportion saying they ‘strongly agreed’ (n=32,606).  Column 2 is the 
proportion who strongly agreed that “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to the 
complex administrative procedures?”
28  Respondents in these countries were also asked 
“suppose you could choose between different kinds of jobs.  Which one would you prefer 
– being an employee or being self-employed?”
29  Column 3 tabulates the proportion 
saying they would like to be self-employed.  It is apparent from the Table that there is a 
desire for self-employment in the A8 countries as well as a perceived lack of financial 
support alongside complex administrative procedures that make it hard to set up in 
business.  It is well known in the literature that capital constraints have a major impact on 
the ability to become and remain self-employed (Blanchflower and Oswald (1998; 
Blanchflower, 2000, 2004).  These factors will likely contribute to a desire to come to the 
UK, where these circumstances may appear less prevalent. 
                                                 
26 See Blanchflower  (2001, 2004) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). 
 
27 Flash Eurobarometers - Entrepreneurship, September 2000, September 2001, November 2002, September 
2003, April 2004. 
 
28 In both of the questions used in columns 1 and 2 possible responses were strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
strongly disagree.  
 
29 This was the same question used in Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer (2001) using data from the 




In summary, holding constant a variety of characteristics including age, qualifications and 
location, recent A8 immigrants have higher self-employment rates and lower wages than 
natives, but similar unemployment rates.  In contrast, recent non-A8 migrants have a 
higher probability of being unemployed, comparable wages and lower self-employment 
rates than natives.  A8 migrants who arrived before 2004 have very low unemployment 
rates and high self-employment rates, but lower wage rates than natives.   
 
5) Review of the empirical evidence on the impact of immigration flows on natives 
 
A big issue we need to confront is the extent to which the new wave of immigrants has 
impacted the UK labour market.  The literature, from across many countries suggests that 
impacts of immigration on non-immigrant employment and unemployment outcomes are 
minimal, but there is some evidence of wage effects.    
 
“Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on 
the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the 
literature on this question does not provide much support for this 
conclusion…There is no evidence of economically significant reductions in 
native employment.  Most empirical analysis of the United States and other 
countries finds that a 10 per cent increase in the fraction of immigrants in 
the population reduces native wages by at most 1 percent.  Even those 
natives who should be the closest substitutes with immigrant labour have not 
been found to suffer significantly as a result of increased immigration”, 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995, p.42) 
 
Most of the studies relate to a one-off permanent movement of workers from one country 
to another, rather than movements back and forth between countries as appears to be 
happening in the UK.  This is similar to (illegal) worker flows between Mexico and the 
United States as well as legal flows between countries, such as India and a number of 
Gulf states (eg the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait). 
 
The empirical evidence from around the world suggests that, even when there have been 
very large flows of migrants, which are greater in magnitude than the one’s the UK has 
experienced from the A8, that there have been few if any measured impacts on native 
outcomes.  This is confirmed by a recent report by the European Commission (2006) 
which concluded that “mobility flows between the EU-10 and the EU-15 are very limited 
and are simply not large enough to affect the EU labour market in general” (2006, p.13).  
The Commission concluded that migrants play a complementary role in the EU-15 labour 
markets alleviating skills bottlenecks and contributing to long-term growth.  Heinz and 
Ward-Warmedinger (2006) drew similar conclusions, arguing that “migration of workers 
from the new EU-10 did not crowd out national workers and had a positive impact on the 
old EU-15 by alleviating labour market shortages in certain areas and supporting 
increased employment” (2006, p. 26).  The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) concluded that “in a wide variety of jobs in western Europe there is hardly any 
direct competition between immigrants and local workers” (2005, p.168).  The IOM went 
on to conclude that “the economic gains from immigration are small, but positive, with 
the benefits, however, invariably distributed unequally. Most gains accrue to the migrants  
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and owners of capital, and can have positive knock-on effects for global GDP levels. The 
‘losers’ are often the local workers with similar skills to the migrants, but again the 
overall losses seem minimal” (2005, p. 19).   
 
Longhi et al (2005) recently performed a meta-analysis of 348 estimates of the percentage 
change in the wage of native workers with respect to a 1 percentage point increase in the 
ratio of immigrants over native workers.  Studies were examined from the US, Germany, 
the Netherlands, France, Norway, Austria, Israel and Australia.  The authors concluded 
that the overall impact was very small.  “A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of immigrants in the labour force lowers wages across the investigated studies by only 
0.119%” (2005, p.472).   
 
Australian and Canadian studies, for example, fail to show negative effects of 
immigration on labour market outcomes (Addison and Worswick, 2002; Pope and 
Withers (1993); Akbari and DeVoretz, 1992).  Constant (2005) also has a small effect for 
France. Zorlu and Hartog (2005) examined the impact of immigration on native worker's 
wages in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway and also found very small effects.    
 
In the US, Altonji and Card (1991) found that a one percentage point increase in the 
fraction of immigrants in the population reduced wages by 1.2% and did not affect 
unemployment.  Card, D. (2005) has noted that “although immigration has a strong effect 
on the relative supplies of different skill groups, local labour market outcomes of low 
skilled natives are not much affected by these relative supply shocks” and later “overall 
evidence that immigrants have harmed the opportunities of less skilled natives is scant.”  
Evidence of a small negative wage effect is also found in Friedberg and Hunt (1995), 
Borjas (1999) and Card and Lewis (2005).   
 
More recently, Borjas (2003, 2006) and Borjas and Katz (2005) have argued that the 
negative impacts are large.  They used national data from five censuses to show that US 
workers lost on average about 3% of the real value of their wages because of immigration 
over the period 1980-2000, and that this loss reached 9% for high school dropouts. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006), however, using a general equilibrium approach, find 
that overall immigration from 1990-2004 has generated a large positive impact on the 
average wages of the US born, primarily because they find that US and foreign born 
workers belong to different skill groups.  The least educated also suffer smaller losses 
than previously calculated.   
 
Cortes (2005) found that low-skilled immigration benefits the native population by 
decreasing the non-traded-goods component of the cost of living.  A 10 percent increase 
in the average city's share of immigrants decreases the price of immigrant intensive 
services, such as housekeeping and gardening, by 1.3 percent with wages being the likely 
channel: Cortes found such an increase lowers the wages of low-skilled natives by 0.6 
percent and low-skilled immigrants by 8 percent.  Cortes found that low-skilled 
immigration “brings positive benefits to the US economy, but generates a redistribution 
of wealth; it reduces the real income of low-skilled natives and raises the real income of 
high-skilled natives.”  
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Dustman et al (2005) examined the way immigration impacted native outcomes in the 
UK using data from the 1983-2000 Labour Force Surveys. They used pooled data for 
eighteen years across seventeen regions (n=306) but, because of data availability, for the 
period 1992-2000 for wages. Empirically they estimated a series of regressions with the 
immigrant-native ratio as a control.  Their main findings were that there was little 
evidence of any adverse outcomes for natives on wages, employment or unemployment, 
consistent with the findings for the US and elsewhere.  If there was evidence of any 
adverse outcomes it was limited to those with intermediate levels of education.  An 
increase in immigration, amounting to one per cent of the native population in their 
preferred IV specification, would lead to a decrease of 0.07 percentage points in the 
native  employment rate, but this was not significant at conventional levels. IV is 
necessary because immigrant shares and immigrant outcomes may be spatially correlated 
because of common fixed influences.  Furthermore, the authors found no evidence of any 
significant effects on wages, unemployment or participation using their IV specification.  
 
Hatton and Tani (2005) also find modest wage and employment effects in the UK, but 
also find evidence of negative correlations between immigration from abroad to a region 
and in-migration from other regions.  These are only significant in southern regions 
where immigration of foreign citizens is concentrated.  The authors suggest that this is an 
important mechanism through which the British labour market adjusts.  Frijters et al. 
(2005) find that immigrant job search is less successful than that of natives; immigrants 
are as likely to gain employment through informal methods as via verifiable routes; the 
probability of success increases with years since migration. The finding that immigrants 
do not effectively compete for jobs may thus help explain why immigration has little 
impact on native employment.  
 
Manacorda et al (2006) find evidence that natives and immigrants in the UK are 
imperfect substitutes, like Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) for the US.  They find that a 
10% rise in the share of immigrants increases native-migrant male wage differentials by 
2%.  This acts to attenuate any effect of increased labor supply on the native wage 
distribution and then only has a sizeable effect on wages of migrants who were already in 
the UK.  It also helps explain the findings of Dustman et al (2005) and others that the 
wage impact of immigration on natives is small. 
 
Gilpin et al (2006) recently conducted a careful econometric analysis of the impact of the 
new A8 migrants.  In particular they focussed on their impact on the claimant count, as 
this is not a sample. They found that: 
 
“despite anecdotal evidence, there is no discernible statistical evidence 
which supports the view that the inflow of A8 migrants is contributing to a 
rise in claimant unemployment in the UK” (2006, p.49). 
 
There have been a number of papers that have examined major flows of immigrants into a 
country using natural experiments. The opening of the UK to A8 immigrants is directly 
comparable to these exogenous supply shocks to the various labour markets. These 
include the Mariel boatlift into the US from Cuba in 1980 as well as from Algeria to 
France in 1962 after independence; Jews to Israel from the Soviet Union between 1990 
and 1994; to Portugal from Mozambique and Angola in the mid 1970s; to several  
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European countries as a result of the Balkan Wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s; into 
Austria especially from the former Yugoslavia, and finally to Germany between 1985 and 
1989, particularly from Turkey.  The evidence from these studies is remarkably 
consistent – these immigrant flows have had little or no significant/substantive impact on 
any native outcomes.  There is a reason to believe that the scale of any impact from these 
experiments would be greater than that from the A8 in the UK, as in most cases the scale 
of the influx was greater, and in many cases, there was no potential return of the migrants 




th 1980 Fidel Castro declared that Cuban nationals wishing to go to the US 
could leave freely from the port of Mariel, and approximately 125,000 did.  Card (1990) 
found that wages and employment opportunities for Miami's population were hardly 
impacted at all by the boatlift.  The trends observed in Miami were comparable to those 
in other cities such as Atlanta, Houston, Tampa and Los Angeles that did not experience 
the Mariel flow.  In fact the wages of unskilled black workers rose relative to wages in 
the four comparison cities.  Similarly, the unemployment rate among low-skilled blacks 
improved.  Among Hispanics there was an increase in Miami's unemployment rate 
relative to that in the other cities in 1981, but from 1982-1985 the Hispanic 
unemployment rate in Miami fell faster than in the comparison cities.  It does appear 
though that some residents left Miami in response to Mariel and other migrants went 
elsewhere; the rate of Miami's population growth after 1980 slowed considerably relative 
to the rest of Florida.  
 
b) France  
Hunt (1992) examined the impact of the arrival of 900,000 people of European origin 
returning to France within one year following the independence of Algeria in 1962, 
which increased France’s labour force by 2%.  Hunt found that, despite the fact that the 
repatriates had high unemployment rates themselves, there was no evidence that this flow 
of migrants had any sizable impact on unemployment of non-repatriates.  A one 
percentage point higher proportion of repatriates implied an increase in non-repatriate 
unemployment of at most 0.2 percentage points.  There was also weak evidence on the 
impact on wages – a one percentage point higher proportion of repatriates was associated 
with 0.8% lower wages.  The labour-force participation of non-repatriates was unaffected 
by the presence of the repatriates. 
 
c) Portugal 
Carrington and deLima (1996) found that when the African colonies of Mozambique and 
Angola became independent of Portuguese colonial control in the mid 1970s, 
approximately 600,000 people returned to Portugal, increasing its population by 
approximately 7%.  The returnados, who were at least as skilled as Portuguese natives, 
“had only a modest effect on the Portuguese labour market” (1996, p.341).  Comparisons 
with Spain and France suggested that any adverse impacts were quantitatively swamped 
by the European-wide downturn in labour market conditions in the 1970s.  Comparisons 
across districts within Portugal showed that those with a higher proportion of immigrants 
did have lower wage growth, but because of the timing and persistence of the wage 





Immigration increased Israel's population by 12 percent between 1990 and 1994 after 
immigration restrictions were lifted in the Soviet Union, increasing the population by 
over 7 percent in two years.  Friedberg (2001) examined the impact of this rapid influx of 
workers.  She found that following the influx occupations that employed more 
immigrants had substantially lower native wage growth and slightly lower native 
employment growth.  Using OLS she found that a 10 percent increase in occupational 
employment because of immigration was associated with a 3-6 percent decline in the real 
earnings of natives in that occupation.  However, because the immigrants' post-migration 
occupational distribution is influenced by relative labor market conditions across 
occupations, OLS estimates are biased.  Using IV, with previous occupation as the 
instrument, Friedberg found no adverse impact of immigration on any native outcomes 
including wages and employment of natives.   
 
e) Germany 
Pischke and Velling (1997) examined the impact of the influx of foreign workers into 
Germany between 1985 and 1989, particularly from Turkey, on employment and 
unemployment rates.  Between these two years the share of Turks in the population rose 
from 1.6% to 1.9%, while the foreign share of the population rose from 4.9% to 5.6%. 
Their results “consistently show that there is little evidence for displacement effects due 
to immigration (p. 603).”  This is consistent with the findings of Mühleisen and 
Zimmermann (1994), who also found negligible impacts of foreign labour on 
unemployment in Germany.  
 
f) Austria 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996, 1999) examined the impact of a dramatic rise in 
the share of alien workers in Austria as a result of the breakdown of the former 
communist regimes, especially from former Yugoslavia.  Between 1988 and 1991 the 
foreign share of employment in Austria increased from 5.4% to 9.0%. Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller (1999) find only a modest impact of immigration on the unemployment risk 
for native workers under the age of 35.  Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996) found 
negligible or even positive wage effects. 
 
g) Europe 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) use the Balkan Wars as a Mariel-boatlift style immigration 
experiment to examine the impact of immigration in the European Economic Area for 
1983-1999.  There was very little change in immigration flow until 1988, but the late 
1980s and early 1990s saw a marked upturn.  The increases were greatest for Germany, 
beginning in 1989 and later in Finland, France and Sweden.  The flow from Yugoslavia 
was particularly important after 1990.  Angrist and Kugler (2003) found that an increase 
in the foreign share of 10% would reduce native employment rates by 0.2-0.7 percentage 
points. There was also some evidence that the impact of the foreign share on the 
employment of native men was greatest in countries with less flexible labour markets, 
higher replacement rates and higher entry costs.  The estimates typically imply more 
native job losses in countries with less flexible labour and product markets. 
   
23 
The empirical evidence from around the world suggests that, even when there have been 
very large flows of migrants, which are greater in magnitude than the one’s the UK has 
experienced from the A8, that there have been few, if any, measured impacts on native 
outcomes. 
 
6) The macro-economic policy consequences of A8 migration 
a) Immigration and inflation 
 
The Monetary Policy Committee is interested in immigration to the extent that it affects 
inflation and growth in the medium term.  The purpose of this section is to bring together 
the findings reported earlier in this paper to make a judgement about the prospects for 
growth and inflation in the near term, as we see them at present. 
 
The overall impact of immigration, including immigration from the A8 countries, on 
inflation and growth is on its own not clear-cut – there is no automatic rule-of-thumb that 
we can look to in order to determine the impact on the economy.  This is because 
immigrants are both consumers and workers/producers, and so immigration affects both 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  And it is the balance between demand and 
supply (sometimes called the output gap) that determines inflation.  So the MPC needs to 
take a judgement about whether immigration has added more to supply or to demand in 
recent years.  We look at each of these in turn. 
 
In thinking about the supply potential of the economy, most people would probably agree 
that extra (immigrant) workers in the economy would raise the supply potential of the 
economy.  But the extent to which aggregate supply increases will depend on the 
economic characteristics of immigrants relative to native workers.  A recent survey of 
contacts of the Bank of England’s regional Agents suggested that the new A8 migrants 
were highly productive.  This is consistent with the findings of a Home Office Study on 
the use of migrant labour that concluded as follows. 
 
“Employers cited advantages of migrant workers in terms of their general 
attitude and work ethic. They tended to be more motivated, reliable and 
committed than domestic workers.  For example, migrants were said to be 
more likely to: demonstrate lower turnover and absenteeism; be prepared 
to work longer and flexible hours; be satisfied with their duties and hours 
of work; and work harder in terms of productivity and speed. In the view 
of some employers, the more favourable work ethic of migrant workers 
encouraged domestic workers to work harder.” (Dench, 2006) 
 
 
In Saleheen and Shadforth (2006) it was argued that immigration of higher skilled (or 
more productive) workers could temporarily raise the domestic rate of productivity 
growth; and that immigrant labour could lower the natural rate of unemployment, either 
by filling skill gaps (assuming that foreign-born workers are complementary to the 
domestic workforce) or by tempering wage demands, as wage bargainers become aware 
that they can be replaced more easily than in the past.  In support of the latter argument, 
the OECD Economic Outlook (2006b) notes that “international as well as UK evidence  
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suggests [that] immigration can serve to make the labour market as a whole more fluid 
and wages less sensitive to demand fluctuations.”  Katz and Krueger (1999) argue that 
recruitment agencies for temporary workers have also contributed to declines in the 
natural rate.  Shimer (1998) argues that time series changes in the natural rate of 
unemployment in the US are driven by demographic changes; the declining natural rate 
of unemployment over the last decade or so has resulted from declines in the proportion 
of individuals in the population that had high propensities for unemployment.  So the 
aging of the baby boom generation was particularly important as the proportion of the 
population that was young – and subject to high unemployment rates – declined over 
time.  The analogy for the UK is that the workforce has increased in size as a result of 
adding a group – the A8 – with a relatively low propensity to be unemployed and to claim 
benefits.  The workforce appears more flexible and mobile than it was before the entry of 
workers from the A8.
30  They had no entitlement to benefits so the replacement rate in the 
economy has fallen, once again lowering the natural rate of unemployment.  These A8 
migrants have likely reduced the natural rate through their impact on the wage bargaining 
process, lowering the bargaining power of native workers.  The ‘fear’ of unemployment 
has risen (Blanchflower, 1991). 
 
In thinking about aggregate demand, most people would agree that immigrants are extra 
consumers and that they raise aggregate consumption demand.  It is likely that 
immigrants spend a lower fraction of their income when compared to domestic workers, 
perhaps because they send remittances back home or spend less on durable goods while 
temporarily resident in the UK – this would, on its own, suggest that immigrants raise 
demand by less than they raise supply.
31  However, the funds that migrants send home 
might be recycled back to the UK through greater export demand, and UK consumers 
might also benefit from lower prices as a result of the extra productivity of migrants. 
Aggregate demand might also rise because of increased investment.  The theoretical 
argument here is that firms require both labour and capital to produce their output.   
Immigration gives them more labour, and firms may wish to supplement this with more 
capital.  But the extent to which investment rises, and how quickly, will depend on the 
skills of immigrants and the technologies of firms.  If firms are able to substitute between 
labour and capital, then there may be a smaller impact on investment than might 
otherwise be the case.  Early work by Welch (1969), Griliches (1970) and Berndt and 
Christensen (1974) all suggested that physical capital is more complementary with skilled 
than with unskilled labour. More recently, Lewis (2006) found that US cities with a larger 
share of migrant labour are also the ones with less capital intensive production 
technologies.  
 
                                                 
30 Borjas (2001) argues that immigration “greases the wheels of the labor market by injecting into the 
economy a group of persons who are very responsive to regional differences in economic opportunities” 
(2001, p.2).  This has the effect of improving labour market efficiency and hence leads to a more efficient 
allocation of national resources. 
 
31 Saleheen and Shadforth (2006) show that according to IPS data, most immigrants intend to stay in the 
United Kingdom for a maximum of four years. 
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On balance we would suggest that at present it appears that recent A8 immigration has 
acted to reduce the natural rate of unemployment in the UK and raised the supply 
potential of the economy. But it also seems that recent immigration is likely to have 
raised potential supply by more than it has raised demand, and thereby has acted to 
reduce  inflationary pressures.  This argument holds for three reasons.  First, the 
consumption behaviour of native workers may have been affected by the increased ‘fear’ 
of unemployment resulting from a more flexible labour market.  Second, the recycling of 
remitted funds back to the UK is unlikely to b e  p e r f e c t .   T h i r d ,  f i r m s  m a y  a b l e  t o  
substitute between capital and labour, offsetting some of the potential for investment 
spending to rise.    
 
Is the recent rise in the unemployment rate structural? 
 
While we currently believe that immigration on its own is likely to have reduced the 
natural rate of unemployment and inflationary pressures in the past few years, there are 
off-setting forces that may have pushed the natural rate back up more recently.  In 
particular, developments in the labour market over the past year, such as the up-rating of 
the national minimum wage (NMW) and the rising participation of older workers could 
have, ceteris paribus, raised the natural rate, with corresponding implications for inflation 
and growth prospects going forward. 
 
A key question surrounding these prospects is how to interpret the recent rise in the actual 
unemployment rate.  If it has occurred without a rise in the natural rate of unemployment 
then one might conclude that there is more slack in the labour market relative to the past, 
and continued immigration is likely to keep inflationary pressures down in the future.  
But, if the natural rate has risen then there is more uncertainty about whether spare 
capacity has risen over the past year. 
 
Why might the natural rate of unemployment have risen?  In the section on the 
characteristics of immigrants we found that immigrants are more likely to be young, and 
that the pay of new immigrants (including those from the A8 countries) is lower than that 
of previous immigrants and UK-born workers. Given this, a rise in labour supply via 
immigration will mean that there will be a larger fraction of young workers in the 
economy who have a higher probability of unemployment.  This change to the 
demographic mix of the population may raise the natural rate.
32 Similarly the increased 
participation of older workers may also have raised the natural rate of unemployment if 
they have displaced younger workers.  Or, if the level of the NMW is set at rate that is 
higher than the level at which local labour markets would otherwise clear, this will tend 
to lower the demand for labour and raise the natural rate of unemployment.  The rise in 
the NMW, coupled with the fact immigrant workers tend to earn less – and so are likely 
to benefit from the rise in the NMW – could also lead to a rise in the natural rate of 
                                                 
32 Shimer (1998) finds that demographic changes – such as shifts in the labour force to groups with 
different propensities to being unemployed – are important determinants of the natural rate.  He argues that 
changes in demographics can explain the bulk of the decline in the NAIRU and seems to fit very closely 
with Staiger, Stock and Watson's (1997) estimate of the NAIRU, except during the Vietnam war.  
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unemployment.  These changes could more than cancel out any declines from A8 
immigration outlined above. 
 
The challenge for policy makers is that it is very difficult to obtain an accurate estimate 
of the natural rate of unemployment, particularly in real time.  But policy makers need to 
take a judgment about the degree of spare capacity in the economy, and that requires 
some judgment about the natural rate of unemployment.  For that reason we investigate 
whether the recent rise in unemployment is related to the three structural changes outlined 
above: the rise in immigration; the participation of older workers; and, the up-rating of 
the NMW.  If it is, then one might argue that the rise in the unemployment rate has been 
accompanied by a rise in the natural rate of unemployment.  This analysis exploits the 
regional variation in each of these factors, but is unable to provide conclusive evidence of 
any change.   
 
First, has the recent rise in unemployment been highest in regions which have seen the 
largest increase in immigration?  Chart 3 shows new immigrants – those arriving since 
the start of 2004 – are more likely to settle, at least initially, in London than elsewhere.  
Chart 4 shows the change in the share of new immigrants going to each region.  The fact 
that London is negative means that a smaller share of immigrants settled in London in 
2006, compared to 2005.  The regions that have seen a falling share of migrants are 
London, the East, North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humber and Wales: three (Y&H, 
NE & London) out of these six regions have also seen some of the largest increases in 
their unemployment rates (Chart 5).  But, Chart 6 shows the opposite of what we might 
have expected; regions with the biggest increases in immigration have tended to see the 
smallest rises in their unemployment rates.
33, 34 Of course, this is consistent with the 
possibility that foreign workers are attracted to those regions where the unemployment 
rate is lowest and opportunities are greatest, for which there appears to be some evidence 











                                                 
33 Note that the negative correlation shown in Chart 6 is not statistically significant.  A regression of the 
change in the total unemployment rate (between 2005q3 and 2006q3) on the change in the share of new 
immigrants (between 2005 and 2006) gives a t-statistic of -1.02.  
 
34 We look at changes in the regional share of immigrants in charts 6, 9 and 12.  One might consider 
weighting the shares to reflect the number of employees in each region as a bigger effect might be expected 
in regions which have received more migrants.  However, WRS data suggest that while most migrants 
settle in London and the South East, the ratio of A8 migrants to the current population by region is broadly 
the same nationwide, at around 1:67.    
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Chart 3: The share of new immigrants in 
each region (2006) 
Chart 4: The change in the share of new 





















































































































































































































































Chart 5: The change in the rate of 
unemployment across regions (2005q3-
2006q3) 
Chart 6: Have regions with the biggest 
rise in unemployment also seen the 
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Chart 7: Regional unemployment rates 
in 2005 and the change in immigration 
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1. pp = percentage points  
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However, we know that most immigrants are young (43% of workers on the WRS are 
aged 18-24), and that the most recent rise in the aggregate unemployment rate has been 
driven by an increase in youth unemployment.  In fact, the proportion of total 
unemployment accounted for by 18-24 year olds has been rising steadily, from 24.3% of 
the total in 2000, to 30.7% in 2006Q3.
35  So what about the possibility that the influx of 
migrants has increased the youth unemployment rate?   
 
Chart 8 shows regions with the largest increases in total unemployment were not 
necessarily regions with the largest increases in youth unemployment.  Chart 9 shows that 
there is only a weakly positive (but statistically insignificant) relationship between those 
regions that have witnessed the largest increases in youth unemployment and those that 
have seen the biggest influxes of new immigrants.  So it seems that the increase in the 
unemployment rate of 18-24 year olds has had relatively little to do with the influx of 
migrants. 
 
Chart 8: The change in the youth 
unemployment rate across regions 
(2005q3-2006q3) 
Chart 9: Have regions with the biggest 
rise in youth unemployment also seen the 
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Source: ONS and LFS micro-data, 2005-2006Q3 
 
1. pp= percentage points 
 
What about the possibility that the increased participation of older workers has displaced 
younger workers?  The horizontal axis in Chart 10 plots the change in the activity rates of 
workers above state pension age
36 between 2005Q3 and 2006Q3 for all regions in the 
UK. Activity rates among older workers have increased in all regions, but there appears 
to be no correlation between the increased activity rates of older workers and the 
increased unemployment rates of youth workers at a regional level. The outlier 




                                                 
35 This rise has occurred subsequent to the NMW being implemented on April 1st 1999. 
 
36 Age 60 for women and 65 for men. 
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Chart 10: Have regions with the biggest 
rise in older workers activity rates also 
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Source: ONS  
 
1. pp= percentage points 
 
 
Can the rising NMW explain the increase in the unemployment rate?  There may be 
something in this, especially given the most recent increases in the NMW on October 1st 
2006: from £5.05 to £5.35 (5.9%) for those aged over 22; from £4.25 to £4.45 (4.7%) for 
18-21 year olds; and from £3 to £3.30 (10.0%) for 16-17 year olds.
37   
 
The minimum wage is set nationwide in nominal terms and hence its real level varies 
markedly by region; its real value is much higher outside London and the South East and 
that is where it is expected to bite (Stewart, 2002), because it will enter at a higher point 
on the wage distribution.  The minimum is also most likely to bind for unskilled 22-24 
year olds who are paid adult rates and 18 year olds who jump from the 16-17 year olds’ 
rate.   
 
Chart 11 shows how two of the NMW rates compare to wages at the bottom end (10
th 
percentile) of the wage distribution in each region using ASHE, and additionally for each 
age group using the LFS micro-data.  According to the data, the newly announced 
minimum wages are likely to be a binding constraint for employers in all regions except 
London and the South East for the over 22’s and in all regions for those aged 18-21.  
Taking the LFS data at face value, it is possible that employers may respond to (or have 
already responded to) the higher minimum wage rates by cutting back on employment.  If 
that were the case, then one might argue that the natural rate of unemployment may have 
been pushed up recently.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Between April 1999 and October 2006 both the Adult and Development rates rose by approximately 48% 
Earnings, as measured by the whole economy AEI, have risen by 35% between April 1999 and September 
2006 both including and excluding bonus payments). 
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Chart 11: Does the minimum wage bind 
in different regions? 
Chart 12: Have regions hit the hardest 
by the national minimum wage seen the 
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Source: ONS and LFS micro-data, 2005-2006Q3 
 
1. The chart excludes from the LFS data those earning less than 
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Source: ONS, DTI and own calculations  
 
 
There are estimates from the Department of Trade and Industry of the number of workers 
in each region who are likely to get a pay rise as a consequence of the recent rises in the 
NMW.
38  We compute a measure of the ‘share’ of workers in each region who will be 
affected by the NMW by dividing this DTI estimate by the total number of employees in 
each region.  Against this we plot the change in youth unemployment (Chart 12).  The 
chart shows that regions hit most by the NMW are also the regions which have seen the 




39 have failed to find statistically significant evidence that the introduction of 
the NMW, and past increases to it, have had adverse affects on the demand for labour and 
employment.  While it is too early to test the impact of the most recent increment, it is 
clear that if the NMW continues to rise then eventually it will start to have an impact on 




Over the past eighteen months the unemployment rate has risen by 0.8 percentage points.  
To find out whether this rise in unemployment has been related to structural factors we 
have investigated whether regional changes in the unemployment rate have been 
correlated with changes in the share of new immigrants, older worker activity rates or 
estimates of the number of people that will benefit from rises in the NMW.  We have 
                                                 
38 See Department of Trade and Industry (2006) Government evidence to the low pay commission on the 
economic effects of the National Minimum Wage, Table F2) 
 
39 See for example Dickens and Draca (2005) and Stewart (2002, 2004). 
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found that there are no significant relationships between any of these variables and the 
rise in actual (and youth) unemployment rates across regions.   
 
Of course, there may be other macro-economic factors that might have raised the natural 
rate of unemployment, at least temporarily.  Nickell (2006) has noted that the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment will rise if workers attempt to sustain rates of real wage growth 
when the rate consistent with stable employment shifts unexpectedly.  If workers persist 
in attempting to bargain for rates of real wage growth which take no account of the 
movement in the terms of trade, this will tend to raise unemployment.  Exactly the same 
argument applies if there is an unexpected fall in trend productivity growth, perhaps 
brought about by rises in oil prices or an increase in labour taxes.  For example, if labour 
taxes (payroll tax rates plus income tax rates plus consumption tax rates) go up, the real 
post-tax consumption wage must fall if real labour costs per employee facing firms are 
not to rise.  Any resistance to this fall would lead to a rise in unemployment.  To this 
point there is no evidence of significant wage resistance or second round effects from the 
recent oil shock; wage increases have remained benign, presumably in part because of the 
dampening effect of the recent A8 migrant flow. 
 
Our findings are not conclusive evidence, but they do suggest that the recent rise in the 
unemployment rate is unrelated to structural factors.  In other words, there is no evidence 
from the labour market that the natural rate of unemployment has risen in the past year.  
Policymakers may therefore interpret the rise in the actual unemployment rate as a 
reflection of greater slack in the labour market now compared to a year ago, which is 




UK population growth over the last thirty-five years has been remarkably low in 
comparison with other countries; the population grew by just 7% between 1971 and 2004, 
less than all the other EU15 countries (except Germany), Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and the United States, plus China and India.  The rate of UK population growth 
did exceed that of six countries from the former Soviet bloc (Czech Republic; Croatia; 
Estonia; Hungary; Latvia and Bulgaria), but was below the rates of growth of Poland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
The UK population has grown at a faster pace since the turn of the millennium. This 
recent growth has been driven primarily by changes in net migration.  Both the inflow 
and outflow migration rates have risen but the inflow rate has risen more rapidly, most 
recently, with an influx of migrants from eight East European countries.  However, the 
increase in the net migration flow predates the influx of A8 migrants, reflecting a steady 
rise in the number of immigrants from Asia and the Middle East too.  
 
The propensity to migrate to the UK is higher the lower is GDP per capita in each of the 
A8 countries.  The decision is also strongly correlated with life satisfaction scores and 
unemployment rates, but is uncorrelated with employment rates or rates of inflation.   
 
There appears to be consistent evidence from the Worker Registration Scheme and 
National Insurance Number applications that approximately 500,000 migrants from the  
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A8 countries had come to work in the UK between May 2004 and late 2006.  But other 
sources suggest a significant proportion of these workers – perhaps as many as a half - 
have returned to their country of origin.   
 
The empirical literature from around the world suggests little or no evidence that 
immigrants have had a major impact on native labour market outcomes such as wages 
and unemployment.  Recent work by a number of other authors for the UK is also 
consistent with this view. 
 
The impact of recent migration from the A8 countries on the UK economy will be 
determined by the extent to which immigrants add to supply relative to demand, since it 
is the balance between these two factors that determines prospects for inflation.  We 
argue that at present it appears that A8 immigration has tended to increase supply by 
more than it has increased demand in the UK (in the short run), and thereby acted to 
reduce inflationary pressures. 
  
There seems to be broad agreement that immigration is likely to have reduced the natural 
rate of unemployment in the UK over the past few years.  But there is some uncertainty 
about what has happened to the natural rate in the very recent past and what might 
happen to it in the near future.  This is because immigration has not been the only shock 
to affect the labour market very recently.  This paper examines the relationship between 
the rising unemployment rate and other structural developments across regions, but fails 
to find any statistically significant relationships.  It seems appropriate to conclude that the 
natural rate of unemployment has probably not risen in the very recent past and that 
recent immigration continues to suppress inflationary pressures.  
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Table 1:  Population growth in Europe and the United States, 1971-2004 (%) 
  
  1971-2000 2000-2004 1971-2004
India 84.1 7.0 96.9
Liechtenstein 51.1 5.5 59.5
Australia 46.6 5.0 53.9
China 48.1 2.6 52.1
Canada 39.7 3.8 45.1
Albania 42.9
Iceland 36.4 3.9 41.7
USA 32.6 6.7 41.5
New Zealand 33.1 5.2 40.0
Ireland 27.2 6.9 36.0
Luxembourg 27.4 3.9 32.4
Greece 23.6 1.3 25.3
Spain 18.0 6.0 25.1
Netherlands 20.7 2.2 23.4
Portugal 18.3 2.7 21.5
Japan 20.6 -0.1 20.5
Cyprus 11.9 6.6 19.3
Switzerland 15.6 2.9 18.9
Slovakia 18.2 -0.1 18.1
France 15.1 2.4 17.8
Norway 15.1 2.3 17.7
Poland 17.3 -0.7 16.5
Slovenia 14.4 0.4 14.9
Finland 12.3 1.0 13.4
Sweden 9.6 1.4 11.1
Austria 6.8 2.0 8.9
Denmark 7.6 1.1 8.8
Lithuania 10.1 -1.8 8.1
Italy 5.3 2.2 7.6
Belgium 6.0 1.4 7.5
UK 5.4 1.6 7.0
Germany 4.9 0.4 5.3
Czech Republic 4.7 -0.6 4.1
Croatia 1.6 -1.3 0.3
Estonia 0.2 -1.5 -1.3
Hungary -1.5 -1.0 -2.5
Latvia -0.1 -2.5 -2.7
Bulgaria -5.6 -3.5 -8.9
Romania -1.0  
Source: Eurostat, US Statistical Abstract 2006 and Health Statistics Quarterly, 32, Winter 2006  
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Table 2a:  UK Population changes, 1971-2004/05 ('000's) 
 
Population at Population at Net 
start of period end of period (000s) Percent Births Deaths Migration
1971–76 55,928 56,216 58 0.10% 766 670 -39
1976–81 56,216 56,352 27 0.05% 705 662 -15
1981–86 56,357 56,684 65 0.12% 733 662 -5
1986–91 56,684 57,439 151 0.26% 782 647 13
1991–96 57,439 58,164 145 0.25% 756 639 29
1996–97 58,164 58,314 150 0.26% 740 637 47
1997–98 58,314 58,475 161 0.28% 718 617 60
1998–99 58,475 58,684 209 0.36% 713 634 133
1999–00 58,684 58,886 202 0.34% 688 626 139
2000–01 58,886 59,113 227 0.38% 674 599 153
2001–02 59,113 59,322 209 0.35% 663 601 146
2002–03 59,322 59,554 232 0.39% 682 605 155
2003–04 59,554 59,834 280 0.47% 707 603 177




Source: Population Trends, 124, Summer, 2006 Table 1.6, ONS and Mid-year population estimates,  
ONS, 24










             
  2005  1960/64  1965/69 1970/74 1975/79 1980/84 1985/89 1990/94 1995/99  2000  2003  2004 
EU-25 459.5  230  -34  82  265  15  382  856  645  677  1981  1846 
EU-15 383.4  215  -29  190  280  31  427  926  664  1095  1941  1807 
Belgium 10.4  14.1  16.7  9  7.2  -7.1  8.2  18.8  11  12.9  35.6  35.3 
Denmark  5.4 0.9  1  6.5  2  1.1 6.4 10.6 15.7 10.1  7  5 
Germany 82.5  163  220.7  171.1  14.6  1.8  332.2  562.6  204.4  167.8  142.2  81.8 
Greece  11.1  -41.9  -35.1  -24.8 56.1  17.9  24.4 88.6 61.9 29.4  35.4 34.3 
Spain 43  -109.7  -30.1  -32.1  28.3  0.8  -19.7  49.4  129  389.8  624.6  610.1 
France 60.6  303.7  95.3  114.8  33.8  52.3  49.8  22.5  8  102.7  132.7  100.2 
Ireland 4.1  -20.9  -14.8  10.3  10.1  -6.8  -32.9  -1.4  16  31.8  31.3  47.9 
Italy  58.5  -81.5  -94.3  -45.2  6 -27.8  -2.5 24.4 51.4 55.2  609.5  558.2 
Netherlands 16.3 3.9 9.6  26.7  35.7  14.2  27.4 41.3  30.9  57  7  -9.9 
Austria  8.2  1  10 19.1  -3  3.3  14.4 48.7  7.1 17.2  38.2 61.7 
Portugal 10.5  -78.3  -169.7  -45  88.9  6.1  -31.8  88.9  -7  29.6  47.1  63.5 
Finland 5.2  -11.2  -18.9  1.3  -7.3  4.1  2.4  9  4.2  2.4  5.8  6.8 
Sweden  9.1  10.6  24.6  6.9 17.3  5.2  24.1 32.5  9.6 24.4  28.7 25.3 
UK 60  59.9  -44.7  -32.1  -11.3  -34.3  22.3  21.9  81  143.6  177.7  201.8 
 
Source: Population Statistics 2006 – Eurostat, Table C1 (population) and Table F1 (migration).  
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Table 3: Worker Registration Scheme Data by Country of Origin 
 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia TOTAL
Q2 2004 2,265 595 1,020 2,625 7,115 21,755 3,410 45 38,830
Q3 2004 3,080 690 1,200 3,375 7,065 26,085 4,885 60 46,440
Q4 2004 2,910 580 1,395 2,670 5,090 23,175 4,725 55 40,600
Q1 2005 2,720 710 1,430 3,030 5,540 23,205 4,805 50 41,490
Q2 2005 2,715 720 1,585 4,165 7,230 32,850 5,805 30 55,100
Q3 2005 2,860 600 1,670 3,290 5,720 38,310 6,375 35 58,860
Q4 2005 2,270 530 1,670 2,470 4,490 32,945 5,045 55 49,475
Q1 2006 1,860 390 1,430 2,555 4,220 31,850 4,295 55 46,655
Q2 2006 2,030 340 1,580 2,765 4,440 37,845 5,455 40 54,495
Q3 2006 1,955 340 1,620 1,960 3,735 39,645 5,425 35 54,715
Total 24,665 5,495 14,600 28,905 54,645 307,665 50,225 460 486,660
Total share 5.1% 1.1% 3.0% 5.9% 11.2% 63.2% 10.3% 0.1%  
 





Table 4:  Total International Migration: 1996 to 2005 United Kingdom – 
International Passenger Survey (thousands) 
 
Year European European European Other
All British Non-British Union 15 Union A8 Union 25 Old New foreign
Inflow to the UK
1996 318 94 224 72 : : 29 49 73
1997 326 89 237 72 : : 31 59 76
1998 390 103 287 82 : : 54 51 100
1999 454 116 337 67 : : 54 66 150
2000 483 104 379 63 : : 57 91 168
2001 480 106 373 60 : : 67 84 162
2002 513 95 418 63 : : 66 93 197
2003 513 106 407 64 : : 63 103 177
2004 582 88 494 65 52 117 76 143 158
2005 565 91 474 61 80 145 68 121 140
Outflow to the UK
1996 264 156 108 44 : : 17 14 32
1997 279 149 131 53 : : 20 20 38
1998 251 126 126 49 : : 20 13 44
1999 291 139 152 59 : : 29 12 52
2000 321 161 160 57 : : 32 15 55
2001 308 159 149 49 : : 32 19 49
2002 359 186 174 52 : : 42 16 64
2003 362 191 171 50 : : 42 17 62
2004 359 208 152 39 4 43 35 20 54
2005 380 198 181 39 16 56 39 24 62
Net flow
1996 54 -62 116 28 : : 12 35 41
1997 47 -60 106 19 : : 11 39 38
1998 139 -23 161 33 : : 34 38 56
1999 163 -23 185 8 : : 25 54 98
2000 162 -57 219 6 : : 25 76 113
2001 172 -53 224 11 : : 35 65 113
2002 154 -91 244 11 : : 24 77 133
2003 151 -85 236 14 : : 21 86 115
2004 223 -120 342 26 48 74 41 123 104




Source: Over 500 migrants a day gained through migration to the UK, ONS, November 2006 
 
Figures have been rounded independently and may not add to totals.  Based mainly on data from the 
International Passenger Survey. Includes adjustments for (1) those whose intended length of stay changes 
so that their migrant status changes; (2) asylum seekers and their dependants not identified by the IPS; and 
(3) flows between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Up to and including 2003, estimates are shown only 
for the EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Irish Republic, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). From 2004, the estimates are also shown for A8 
(the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and the EU25 
(i.e. the EU15 and A8 groups, plus Malta and Cyprus). British citizens are excluded from all EU groupings 
and are shown separately. Includes estimates of South African citizenship for all years.  From 2004, the 
New Commonwealth excludes Malta and Cyprus.  Figures for all years include Hong Kong.  
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Table 5:  Numbers of overseas nationals entering the UK and allocated a National 
Insurance number 
 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
All 349.2 370.7 439.7 662.4
Europe – EU accession countries 12.0 20.3 111.1 271.0
Europe - EU excl. accession countries  80.7 84.9 81.3 97.6
Europe – non EU 20.6 24.1 22.2 21.2
Asia & Middle East 114.5 115.1 110.1 134.2
Australasia and Oceania 27.3 24.2 23.4 32.5
The Americas 26.6 31.2 26.7 31.4
Africa 66.7 70.1 64.5 73.9
Others and unknown 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6  
 
Source: 'National Insurance number allocations to overseas nationals entering the UK',   
Department of Work and Pensions, 2006 page 8.  
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Table 6:  Worker Registration Scheme Data by region 
 
Region
a 2004Q3 2005Q3 2006Q3 Total Overall %
2006Q3 % change 
in unemployment 
on a year earlier
b 
East of England 7,855 8,430 7,435 73,035 15.0% 20.2%
London 8,920 5,935 4,885 63,795 13.1% 23.5%
Midlands 4,225 7,065 7,805 60,010 12.3% 33.3%
Central 4,790 5,935 4,895 49,740 10.2% n/a
North East 3,395 6,620 6,105 47,420 9.7% 22.8%
South West 3,885 5,375 5,460 43,275 8.9% 5.3%
North West 3,180 5,870 5,930 42,880 8.8% 25.8%
Scotland 3,255 5,285 5,000 37,570 7.7% -7.7%
South East 4,350 4,010 3,250 34,215 7.0% 14.0%
Northern Ireland 1,340 2,325 1,915 18,530 3.8% 8.6%
Wales 875 1,560 1,700 12,670 2.6% 18.5%
Unknown 365 455 330 3,520
Total 46,435 58,865 54,710 486,660  
 
 
Source: Accession Monitoring Report May 2004 – September 2006 & May 2004 – June 2006, and Labour 
Market Statistics, First Release, November 2006, Table 18(1) for change in unemployment rate. 
 
a) Regions are based on the applicant’s employer’s postcode, where supplied. 
Regions are defined according to the Post Office’s Postal Address Book regions.
b) Regions are Government office regions.  
Data for West Midlands have been used for the Post Office area of Midlands.
Data from North East and Yorkshire & Humberside have been combined for the Post Office area of North East.  
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2002-03 2005-06 2002-03 2005-06 2006Q3 2006Q3
% migrants % migrants
% 16+ 
population
% change in 
unemployment 
on a year ago
All 349.2 662.4
London 148 235.6 42.4% 35.6% 12.6% 23.5%
South East 37.5 79.9 10.7% 12.1% 13.5% 14.0%
East of England 26.2 52.8 7.5% 8.0% 9.2% 20.2%
North West 21.8 48.9 6.2% 7.4% 11.3% 25.8%
West Midlands 23.4 41.7 6.7% 6.3% 8.9% 33.3%
Scotland 14.5 41.4 4.2% 6.3% 8.5% -7.7%
East Midlands 13.4 38.5 3.8% 5.8% 7.2% 21.4%
Yorks and Humberside 17.9 36.6 5.1% 5.5% 8.4% 34.5%
South West 15.4 33.7 4.4% 5.1% 8.5% 5.3%
Wales 5.4 16.4 1.5% 2.5% 4.9% 18.5%
Northern Ireland 2.5 16.3 0.7% 2.5% 2.8% 8.6%
North East 5.4 11.1 1.5% 1.7% 4.3% 6.3%
Unknown 17.8 9.4 5.1% 1.4%  
 
Source: 'National Insurance number allocations to overseas nationals entering the UK',   Department of 
Work and Pensions, 2006 page 9 and Labour Market Statistics, First Release, November 2006, Table 18(1) 
for percentage of all workers age 16+ and change in unemployment rate.  
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                   All Recent All Recent
a) Age 43 32 28 41 30 43
b) Location of residence
T y n e  &  W e a r   2 11122
Rest of North  4 1 0 1 2 3
S o u t h  Y o r k s h i r e   2 12122
West Yorkshire 4 6 9 3 3 4
Rest of Yorks & Humber  3 3 4 1 1 3
East Midlands   7 8 11 5 5 7
E a s t  A n g l i a    4 56344
Inner London   3 20 15 20 24 5
Outer London  6 20 13 22 16 8
Rest of South East   19 15 14 17 17 19
S o u t h  W e s t    9 45558
West Midlands   4 3 4 6 4 4
Rest of West Midlands   5 2 3 2 1 5
G r e a t e r  M a n c h e s t e r   4 32344
M e r s e y s i d e    2 00112
Rest of North West   4 2 3 2 1 4
W a l e s    5 12235
Strathclyde   4 1 1 1 2 4
Rest of Scotland  5 3 4 2 3 5
Northern Ireland   3 2 3 1 1 3
c) Schooling
Degree or equivalent   18 8 5 21 18 18
Higher education 9 3 1 7 4 9
Apprenticeships & equivalent 25 7 5 12 7 23
GCSE grades a-c or equivalent 24 2 1 9 2 22
Other qualifications 10 62 65 32 56 13
No qualification 14 16 20 18 13 14


















Table 8b:  Sample means, Labour Force Surveys, 2004-2006Q2 (ages 16-70) 
Non-
Immigrants All
A8          All Recent All Recent
d) Economic activity
Male
Employment rate 74.0 84.0 86.8 70.9 67.3 73.7
Self-employment rate 17.2 21.6 10.9 18.6 6.2 17.4
Unemployment rate 5.1 6.1 6.8 7.5 8.8 5.4
Female
Employment rate 62.9 70.6 74.8 53.1 50.7 61.9
Self-employment rate 7.4 11.6 3.7 9.6 5.5 7.6
Unemployment rate 3.9 6.9 8.5 6.7 11.9 4.2
e) Type of job
T e m p o r a r y / P e r m a n e n t  5 1 6 2 092 26
Full-time 73 83 87 77 78 73
f)  Industry
A g r i c u l t u r e  &  f i s h i n g       1 11011
E n e r g y  &  w a t e r   1 00101
Manufacturing 14 18 25 11 12 13
Construction 9 15 11 4 4 8
Distribution, hotels &  19 25 26 21 23 19
Transport & communication  7 8 10 8 5 7
Banking, finance & insurance 15 12 11 19 20 16
Public admin, education &  29 12 9 29 27 28
Other services  6 8 7 6 7 6
Workplace outside UK  0 0 0 0 0 0
g) Occupation
Managers and senior officials      15 5 2 16 11 15
Professional occupations              12 5 2 18 19 13
Associate professional and  14 5 3 16 15 14
Administrative and secretarial     13 6 3 9 7 12
Skilled trades occupations            12 18 14 8 6 12
Personal service occupations       8 9 9 7 9 8
Sales and customer service  8 5 4 6 7 8
Process, plant and machine  8 14 18 7 5 8
Elementary occupations             11 34 44 12 21 11
h) Workplace size
1-10 21 20 15 20 16 20
1 1 - 1 9 9 88899
2 0 - 2 4  5 54454
Don't know but under 25   2 6 5 2 3 2
25-49 14 12 13 11 12 13
50-249 23 24 27 21 22 23
250-499 7 6 7 7 6 8
Don't know but between 25 &  3 7 8 5 6 3
500 or more  16 12 12 22 22 17




Table 9:  Top 20 occupations in which registered workers are employed, by quarter 
applied, May 2004 - September 2006 
 






May 2004 to 
Sept 2006  
 Q1    Q2    Q3    Q4    Q1    Q2    Q3  
 Process operative (other Factory worker)    17,970    10,000    13,100    14,975    15,180    53,255    12,450    13,830    14,450    111,955  
 Warehouse Operative    3,810    2,440    2,565    4,100    4,750    13,855    3,650    4,365    5,375    31,050  
 Kitchen and catering assistants    5,940    2,465    3,495    3,580    2,870    12,410    2,685    3,215    3,160    27,410  
 Packer    5,515    3,045    3,270    3,720    3,335    13,370    2,620    2,910    2,930    27,350  
 Cleaner, domestic staff    4,355    2,135    2,470    3,025    2,565    10,195    3,145    2,905    2,990    23,595  
 Farm worker/ Farm hand    3,350    1,705    4,170    2,420    1,030    9,325    1,915    3,845    2,575    21,010  
 Waiter, waitress    4,980    1,705    2,030    2,255    1,670    7,660    1,525    1,755    1,845    17,765  
 Maid / Room attendant (hotel)    3,375    1,305    1,910    2,140    1,705    7,060    1,665    1,850    1,820    15,765  
 Care assistants and home carers    2,580    1,385    1,590    2,075    1,835    6,885    1,765    1,470    1,395    14,090  
 Labourer, building    2,080    1,140    1,445    1,550    1,145    5,280    1,500    1,785    1,580    12,225  
 Sales and retail assistants    2,535    1,105    1,400    1,615    1,285    5,405    1,245    1,410    1,600    12,195  
 Crop harvester    1,235    610    2,205    1,655    275    4,745    450    1,820    1,135    9,390  
 Food processing operative (fruit / veg)    1,600    705    1,010    895    760    3,370    640    750    735    7,095  
 Bar staff    1,950    665    810    890    610    2,975    550    585    665    6,720  
 Food processing operative (meat)    1,525    565    675    655    660    2,555    485    530    670    5,760  
 Chef, other    1,380    545    625    690    535    2,395    495    605    530    5,410  
 Fruit picker (farming)    545    125    1,170    855    155    2,305    140    705    560    4,255  
 Administrator, general    1,000    400    465    480    435    1,780    395    475    550    4,200  
 Driver, HGV (Heavy Goods Vehicle)    730    570    635    555    460    2,220    350    350    340    3,990  
 Driver, delivery van    580    340    410    420    355    1,525    320    280    300    3,005  
 Total Top 20    67,030    32,955    45,445    48,555    41,610    168,565    37,995    45,445    45,210    364,240  





Notes: This table shows registered workers rather than the number of applications made. The figures are for 
initial applications only (not multiple applications, where an individual is doing more than one job 
simultaneously, nor re-registrations, where an individual has changed employers). The total shown for 2004 is 
for the part year May to December.  Data are from the Worker Registration Scheme. 
Source: Accession Monitoring Report May 2004 –September 2006  
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Table 10: Work permits and first permissions granted by industry; 1995, 2000 and 
2005 
 
 Number    Per cent   Number    Per cent   Number    Per cent  
 Health and medical services    1,774    7.3    14,516    22.5    22,477    26.1  
 Computer services    1,827    7.6    12,726    19.7    15,616    18.1  
 Administration, business and management services  4,041    16.7    9,026    14.0    10,129    11.8  
 Financial services    3,194    13.2    6,997    10.8    6,526    7.6  
 Hospitality, hotels, catering and other services    320    1.3    1,751    2.7    6,494    7.5  
 Education and cultural activities    1,901    7.9    3,832    5.9    6,404    7.4  
 Entertainment and leisure services    2,919    12.1    4,235    6.6    4,260    4.9  
 Manufacturing    1,987    8.2    2,747    4.3    2,970    3.4  
 Construction and land services    182    0.8    751    1.2    2,037    2.4  
 Sporting activities    544    2.3    989    1.5    1,945    2.3  
 Retail and related services    2,826    11.7    927    1.4    1,276    1.5  
 Extraction industries    424    1.8    1,044    1.6    1,086    1.3  
 Law related services    258    1.1    881    1.4    987    1.1  
 Transport    333    1.4    780    1.2    961    1.1  
 Telecommunications    458    1.9    2,228    3.5    858    1.0  
 Government    46    0.2    228    0.4    672    0.8  
 Utilities: gas, electricity, water    168    0.7    498    0.8    492    0.6  
 Agriculture activities    952    3.9    267    0.4    382    0.4  
 Real estate and property services    5    0.0    94    0.1    201    0.2  
 Security and protective services    2    0.0    58    0.1    99    0.1  
 Unconfirmed    –    –    –   –    319    0.4  
 Total    24,161    100.0    64,570    100.0    86,191    100.0  
1995  2000   2005
 
 
Source: Work Permits (UK). Note:   A8 nationals are included in figures prior to May 2004 and Salt and 
Millar (2006), Table 10  
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Table 11:  Eastern European intentions to live and work in the EU in the next 5 
years (conducted in 2001)  
12
Age  -.0046 (14.20) -.0426 (21.23)
Male .0494 (7.68) .2836 (7.31)
Cyprus      .1070 (3.38) .0161 (0.10)
Czech Rep.   .0048 (0.20) .4547 (3.49)
Estonia      .0881 (3.18) .4341 (3.32)
Hungary     .0565 (2.16) .3409 (2.57)
Latvia     .0803 (2.97) .2167 (1.66)
Lithuania     .0998 (3.47) .7387 (5.67)
Poland      .0935 (3.69) .8305 (6.84)
Slovakia    .0461 (1.80) .9649 (7.52)
Slovenia    -.0093 (0.41)   .8303 (6.38)
Age left school 16-19 years -.0061 (0.68) .3062 (5.28)
Age left school 20+ years         .0245 (2.24) .7187 (10.95)
Still studying    .0418 (1.64) .6616 (4.36)
Student   .0595 (2.20) .4338 (2.77)
Unemployed   .0892 (6.16) .3514 (4.28)
Retired -.0241 (1.66) .0613 (0.68)
Farmer  .0156 (0.74) -.0617 (-0.44)
Fisherman .0114  (0.07) 1.0033  (1.31)
Professional  .0732 (2.05) .7596 (3.96)
Owner of a shop                      .0355 (1.86) .3397 (2.96)
Business proprietors  .0224 (0.85) .6679 (4.44)
Employed professional  .0293 (1.44)   .5402 (4.67)
General management .0595 (1.46) .5851 (2.69)
Middle management  -.0181 (1.15) .4953 (5.18)
Employed at desk  .0277 (1.66) .3818 (4.00)
Employed but travelling   .0461 (2.22) .3193 (2.72)
Service job  .0290 (1.70) .2900 (2.96)
Supervisor   .0532 (1.44) .3980 (1.86)
Skilled manual worker .0428 (2.84) .2198 (2.49)
Other (unskilled) manual worker .0161 (0.87) .0204 (0.18)
Remarried .0315 (1.54) .1623 (1.47)
Unmarried, currently living with partne .0495 (3.52) .2946 (3.64)
Unmarried, never lived with a partner .0295 (2.91) .1785 (2.83)
Unmarried, lived with partner, but now  .0703 (3.52) .3849 (3.61)
Divorced .0401 (2.76) .3541 (4.55)
Separated .0137 (0.53) .1665 (1.11)
Widowed -.0051 (0.32)   -.1642 (1.94)






2 0.2107 0.1179  
 
Source: Candidate Eurobarometer 2002.1 (ZA#4153), March-April 2002.   
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Notes: excluded categories – Malta, married, looking after home, Age left school <16. Dprobit column 1 &, 
ordered logit column 2  T-statistics in parentheses.  Sample also includes Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. 
 
The dependent variable in column 1 is set to one if the answer to the following was in the affirmative, zero 
otherwise "do you intend to go and live and work  for a few months or several years  in a current EU 
country in the next five years". In column 2 the dependent variable is based on responses to the following 
question -  "how willing would you be to live in another European country where the language is different 
from your mother tongue?" 1=not at all; 2=not much; 3=to some extent; 4=very much. 
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Table 12: Unemployment Dprobits (ages 16-64) 
 
Immigrant 0.0204 (20.27) 0.0290 (29.62) 0.0004 (0.42) 0.0048 (5.98)
A8 since 2004 0.0087 (2.03) -0.0114 (3.58) -0.0080 (2.59)
Other since 2004 0.0288 (10.59) 0.0095 (4.34) 0.0032 (1.63)
Age 16-17 0.2151 (92.13) 0.1740 (80.84) 0.1476 (90.01)
Age 18-24 0.0833 (73.83) 0.0780 (72.13) 0.0699 (81.39)
Age 25-34 0.0122 (15.36) 0.0133 (17.63) 0.0137 (22.68)
Age 45-54 -0.0049 (6.40) -0.0052 (7.31) -0.0057 (9.87)
Age 55-64 -0.0044 (5.12) -0.0099 (12.50) -0.0086 (12.70)
Male 0.0086 (18.75) 0.0119 (31.07)
Higher education 0.0009 (0.81) -0.0026 (2.88)
A-levels 0.0075 (9.14) 0.0068 (9.88)
GCSE grades A-C 0.0218 (25.28) 0.0192 (26.05)
Other  0.0390 (35.52) 0.0404 (45.10)
None 0.0755 (58.16) 0.0747 (72.03)
Rest of North  -0.0051 (2.83) -0.0065 (4.40)
South Yorkshire  -0.0066 (3.42) -0.0120 (7.91)
West Yorkshire  -0.0132 (8.12) -0.0165 (12.68)
Rest of Yorks/Humber -0.0113 (6.35) -0.0148 (10.59)
East Midlands  -0.0130 (8.63) -0.0190 (16.14)
East Anglia  -0.0138 (8.57) -0.0220 (17.80)
Inner London  0.0056 (2.87) -0.0030 (2.03)
Outer London  -0.0055 (3.36) -0.0178 (14.83)
Rest of South East  -0.0152 (10.67) -0.0261 (23.64)
South West  -0.0174 (12.27) -0.0228 (20.34)
West Midlands   -0.0030 (1.73) -0.0083 (6.00)
Rest of West Midlands  -0.0182 (12.04) -0.0208 (17.24)
Greater Manchester  -0.0114 (6.78) -0.0166 (12.73)
Merseyside  -0.0039 (1.90) -0.0022 (1.29)
Rest of North West  -0.0142 (8.74) -0.0196 (15.24)
Wales  -0.0104 (6.38) -0.0129 (9.84)
Strathclyde  0.0032 (1.65) 0.0031 (1.98)
Rest of Scotland  -0.0075 (4.55) -0.0121 (9.31)
Northern Ireland -0.0114 (6.86) -0.0111 (7.98)
Asian 0.0277 (18.84) 0.0336 (25.27)
Black 0.0584 (27.59) 0.0624 (34.38)
Chinese 0.0200 (4.86) 0.0074 (2.07)




2005 0.0000 (0.04) 0.0005 (0.80) 0.0010 (1.80)
2006 0.0055 (7.97) 0.0061 (9.59) 0.0065 (10.89)
Pseudo R
2 0.0035 0.0644 0.0969 0.0833
N 639,178 639,178 638,722 1,021,910




Source: LFS 2000-2006Q3. 
 
Notes: excluded categories, Tyne and Wear, degree or equivalent; ages 35-44; white.  T-statistics in 
parentheses. Sample ages 16-65.  Region based on region of residence.     
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Table 13:  Log hourly wage equations, 2004-2006 
 
Immigrant 0.0499 (10.05) 0.0793 (13.53) 0.0881 (16.99) 0.0312 (6.37) 0.0283 (5.64)
Age 0.0893 (138.22) 0.0894 (138.27) 0.0733 (127.96) 0.0597 (108.10) 0.0597 (108.06)
Age squared -0.0010 (128.33) -0.0010 (128.49) -0.0008 (112.73) -0.0006 (94.59) -0.0006 (94.58)
Male 0.2281 (85.23) 0.2284 (85.32) 0.2099 (88.48) 0.1593 (64.44) 0.1595 (64.50)
A8 -0.2973 (14.41) -0.3265 (15.67) -0.1515 (8.28) -0.1403 (8.20)
=2004 non-A8 0.0199 (1.61)
=2004 A8 -0.1848 (8.97)
Mixed 0.0065 (0.16) 0.0290 (0.80) -0.0075 (0.22) -0.0078 (0.23)
Asian -0.0756 (8.32) -0.0854 (10.73) -0.1199 (15.93) -0.1193 (15.90)
Black -0.0804 (6.96) -0.0889 (8.78) -0.1731 (18.03) -0.1723 (17.97)
Chinese -0.0460 (1.83) -0.1420 (6.45) -0.1022 (4.97) -0.1013 (4.93)
Other race -0.0268 (2.14) -0.0452 (4.12) -0.0801 (7.79) -0.0801 (7.79)
Schooling dummies No No 6 6 6
Region of work dummies No No No 21 21
Industry dummies No No No 60 60
Workplace size dummies No No No 8 8
 
Adjusted R
2 0.1615 0.1621 0.358 0.4409 0.441
N 153,379 153,352 153,350 151,814 151,814
Note: also includes two year dummies
5 1234 
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Table 14: Self-employment probabilities (ages 16-70) 
 
Immigrant     0.0287 (17.78) 0.0246 (15.86) 0.0273 (17.75) 0.0299 (16.12) 0.0214 (13.48)
A8 immigrant 0.1150 (11.26) 0.1462 (14.15) 0.1708 (16.21) 0.1678 (15.88) 0.0993 (11.46)
A8 since 2004 -0.1082 (15.85) -0.0917 (12.84) -0.0921 (14.56) -0.0919 (14.52) -0.0650 (12.43)
Other since 2004 -0.0830 (20.39) -0.0574 (13.18) -0.0534 (12.75) -0.0530 (12.62) -0.0387 (11.26)
Age 16-17 -0.1122 (37.27) -0.1049 (36.18) -0.1048 (36.21) -0.0794 (40.86)
Age 18-24 -0.0910 (64.60) -0.0898 (67.13) -0.0898 (67.26) -0.0769 (77.27)
Age 25-34 -0.0412 (35.98) -0.0404 (36.50) -0.0407 (36.79) -0.0383 (42.30)
Age 45-54 0.0115 (10.19) 0.0102 (9.30) 0.0098 (8.96) 0.0131 (13.84)
Age 55-64 0.0490 (36.72) 0.0407 (31.33) 0.0401 (30.90) 0.0337 (30.11)
Age 65-70  0.2001 (53.07) 0.1777 (48.66) 0.1771 (48.54) 0.1327 (42.67)
Male               0.0910 (109.15) 0.0907 (108.83) 0.0564 (71.22)
Higher education -0.0196 (13.10) -0.0190 (12.66) -0.0224 (18.25)
A-levels 0.0238 (19.63) 0.0239 (19.77) -0.0133 (13.08)
GCSE grades A-C 0.0064 (5.06) -0.0061 (4.89) -0.0269 (26.03)
Other  0.0101 (7.09) -0.0102 (7.15) -0.0349 (31.69)
None 0.0107 (6.98) 0.0105 (6.83) -0.0294 (25.26)
Mixed -0.0125 (0.96) 0.0038 (0.33)
Asian   0.0116 (4.50) 0.0257 (11.10)
Black -0.0469 (15.06) -0.0355 (13.80)
Chinese 0.0356 (4.87) 0.0362 (5.82)
Other race  -0.0145 (4.06) -0.0076 (2.50)
Region of work dummies No No No No 21
Industry dummies No No No No 60
Pseudo R
2 0.0019 0.036 0.0684 0.0691 0.2131
N 614,289 614,289 614,218 614,049 611,168
5 12 3 4
           
 
Source: LFS 2004-2006Q2.  Notes: equations also include two year dummies. Excluded categories degree 
or equivalent; ages 35-44; white Workers only. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers – ‘Entrepreneurship’, 2000-2004 
 
Notes:  column 1 reports responses to the question do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree that “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to a lack of financial support” and reports % 
who strongly agree.  Column 2 reports responses to the question do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree that “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to the complex administrative 
procedures”.
 1 In both of the questions used in columns 1 and 2 possible responses were  strongly agree, 
agree, disagree; strongly disagree.   Column 3 reports responses to the question “suppose you could choose 
between different kinds of jobs.  Which one would you prefer – being an employee or being self-








Table 15:  Difficulties in becoming self-employed and ‘desire’ for self-employment 
(%). 
12 3
Financial  Administrative Wants to be
Difficulties Difficulties self-employed
Slovenia               62 61 35
Hungary 58 46 47
Lithuania 52 58 62
Malta 52 28 46
Greece 51 37 63
Latvia 48 41 44
Estonia 47 42 49
Poland 42 37 57
Sweden 40 45 35
Cyprus 39 18 59
Austria 39 32 40
Czech Republic  39 33 37
France 38 41 43
Portugal 36 34 70
Spain 35 26 61
Slovakia 33 28 36
Italy 32 31 57
Germany 32 34 46
Luxembourg 30 27 45
Belgium 28 31 37
USA 26 20 66
United Kingdom  24 24 47
Denmark 24 37 36
Iceland 22 15 61
Ireland 21 18 62
Lichtenstein 20 10 54
Finland 18 27 28
Norway 14 25 36
Netherlands 9 16 33  
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometers – ‘Entrepreneurship’, 2000-2004 
Notes:  column 1 reports responses to the question do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree that “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to a lack of financial support” and reports % 
who strongly agree.  Column 2 reports responses to the question do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree that “it is difficult to start one’s own business due to the complex administrative 
procedures”.
 1 In both of the questions used in columns 1 and 2 possible responses were  strongly agree, 
agree, disagree; strongly disagree.   Column 3 reports responses to the question “suppose you could choose 
between different kinds of jobs.  Which one would you prefer – being an employee or being self-




Appendix A – Sources of Data on the numbers of individuals who have arrived in 
the UK 
 
1) Migrants from the A8 are obliged to register on the Home Office administered Worker 
Registration Scheme (WRS) if they are employed in the UK for a month or more.   
Nationals of the A8 countries who wish to take up employment in the UK for a period of 
at least a month are generally required to register with the Home Office to work in the 
UK. Workers who are self-employed do not need to register and are therefore not 
included in these figures; there may also be other workers from the accession countries 
who for one reason or another do not register and are thus also not included in these 
figures.  Failure to apply within one month of starting a job means the employment is 
illegal.   
 
There was a £50 charge (now raised to £70) for the first application.  Individuals working 
in the UK before May 2004 without permission must also register.  After a year of 
constant legal employment, migrants do not have to register on the WRS, instead they are 
entitled to a residence permit which gives the holder the right to live and work in the UK. 
The data from the WRS provided here are data on applicants to the scheme rather than 
applications. Applicants must register more than once if they are employed by more than 
one employer. They must also re-register if they change employer. Each application to 
the WRS therefore represents one job, not one applicant. To avoid counting applicants 
more than once, each applicant is represented only once in the data, with information 
relating to the first  job for which he/she registered.  Workers from these accession 
countries are generally required to have work continuously for 12 months before they are 
entitled to income related benefits.
40  
 
2) International Passenger Survey (IPS) which is a voluntary survey of individuals 
passing through the main UK air and sea ports and the Channel Tunnel.  The IPS 
questions 250,000 passengers annually of whom only 1% are migrants.  The survey is 
based on respondent's intended length of stay and includes questions on age, sex, marital 
status, citizenship and country of last residence.  The benefit of the IPS is that it provides 
data on those who leave as well as those who enter the country making it possible to 
measure net flows. 
 
c) National Insurance number allocations to overseas nationals.
41  NINos are required for 
employment/self-employment purposes or to claim benefits and tax credits.  The 
Department of Work and Pensions is responsible for allocating NINos to overseas 
nationals who apply to their local Jobcentre Plus office.  An interview occurs and 
documentation is examined which may include the use of ultra-violet lighting to ensure 
                                                 
40 Accession Monitoring Report May 2004 – June 2006, Home Office, 22 August 2006.,  
 




passports and visas are genuine.  The DWP Central Control Units corroborate the 
evidence supplied a interview eg checking that an employer is genuine and has made a 
job offer to an applicant.  Once the NINo is allocated HMRC add the NINo onto the 
National Insurance recording System (NIRS) which holds details of national insurance 
contributions and income tax. 
 
d) Work permits 
Over the period 1995 to 2004 total approvals including work permits, first permissions, 
extensions, changes of employment and supplementary employment increased by 326 per 
cent, but was followed by a 7 percent fall in 2005 (Salt and Millar, 2006).  The largest 
annual increases were between 2000 and 2001 as a consequence of the IT boom.  In terms 
of the nationalities covered, out of 86,191 work permits and first permissions 33.9% were 
for Indian nationals followed by 10.7% from the USA.  This compares with 24,161 
admitted in 1995 of which 8.3% were from India and 32.6% from the USA. 
 
The employment of people who are subject to immigration control is regulated by the 
granting of work permits.  Under the 1971 Immigration Act a work permit is issued to a 
specific employer for a named person for a specific job.  A work permit has to be issued 
for all foreign nationals who are not EEA citizens and who wish to work in the UK unless 
they enter on another work-related scheme or have some other status (such as student) 
where some work is allowed.
42   
 
There are five other categories of work permit application a) First Permission – this is 
similar to the work permit but is granted for foreign workers who are already living in the 
UK who do not already have a permit to work. b) In country extension – application from 
an employer who wishes to extend the employment of an individual currently working for 
them in the UK. c) In country change of employment – application from an employer 
who wishes to employ an individual already in the UK who originally entered with a 
work permit for a different employer or who wishes to engage an individual in other work 
for the same employer. d) In country technical change – applications from employers 
who wish to continue to engage an individual in the same job, but where minor details 
have changed, such as the address the individual is working at, or if the individual or the 
employer has changed their name. e)  Work permit extension – extension applications 
from employers to extend the employment of an individual who is out of the UK at the 
time the application is considered.  A8 nationals were covered by work permits are 
included in figures prior to may 2004. 
 
e) The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a continuous household survey, which provides a 
wide range of data on labour market statistics and related topics such as training, 
qualifications, income and disability. The LFS has been running since Spring 1992 in its 
present form, although a LFS has been carried out in Britain since 1973. Between 1973 
and 1983, a biennial survey was carried out during the spring.  In 1984, the survey 
became annual.  In Spring 1992, for the first time, the data were made available quarterly, 
                                                 
42 For further details of work permits etc see Salt and Millar (2006) pages 354-355. 
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with a quarterly sample size approximately equivalent to that of the previous annual data, 
thus becoming the Quarterly Labour Force Survey.  Each quarter, interviews are achieved 
at about 59,000 addresses with about 138,000 respondents.  From January 2006 the LFS 
moved to calendar quarters. 
 
As noted by Saleheen and Shadforth (2006) the LFS relies on additional information 
about the size and composition of the population – population weights – to produce an 
estimate of the “true” immigrant population. The accuracy of the survey will also depend 
on how representative the sample is of the population.  For example, it might be the case 
that immigrants, particularly illegal immigrants, are less likely to respond to the LFS 
survey, so that they are underrepresented in the LFS data.  Similarly, if immigrants, 
particularly temporary immigrants, are less likely to live at private addresses and more 
likely to live in communal establishments, such as guest houses or hotels, the LFS data 
will not accurately reflect the size and characteristics of the immigrant population.  Data 
from the 2001 Census suggest that immigrants are more likely than UK-born individuals 
to live in communal establishments.  But just 1% of the total population lived in 
communal establishments in 2001, suggesting that this is not a major problem, but there 
is some uncertainty about whether the problem has worsened in more recent years.
43 
                                                 




Akbari, A.H. and D.J. DeVoretz, (1992), 'The substitutability of foreign-born labour in 
Canadian production: circa 1980', Canadian Journal of Economics, XXV(3), pp. 604-614.  
 
Addison T, and C. Worswick (2002), 'The impact of immigration on the earnings of 
natives: evidence from Australian micro data', The Economic Record, 78(1), pp.68–78 
 
Altonji, J. and D. Card (1991), 'The effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes 
of natives', in J. Abowd and R. Freeman (eds.), Immigration, Trade and Labor, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
 
Angrist, J.D. and A.D. Kugler (2003), 'Protective or counter-productive? Labour market 
institutions and the effect of immigration on EU natives', Economic Journal, 113, June, 
F302-F331. 
 
Berndt, E.R. and L.R. Christensen (1974), ‘Testing for the existence of a consistent 
aggregate index of labour inputs’, American Economic Review, 64(3), pp. June, pp. 391-
404. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. (1991), ‘Fear, unemployment and pay flexibility’, Economic Journal, 
March, pp. 483-496.  
 
Blanchflower, D.G. (2000), ‘Self-employment in OECD countries’, Labour Economics, 
7, September 2000, pp. 471-505. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. (2004), ‘Self-employment: more may not be better’, Swedish 
Economic Policy Review, 11(2), Fall, pp. 15-74. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. and R.B. Freeman (1997), 'The attitudinal legacy of Communist 
labor relations', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(3), pp. 483-459. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (1994a), The Wage Curve, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (1994b), 'Estimating a British wage curve, 1973-
1990', Economic Journal, September, pp. 1025-1043. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (1998), 'What makes an entrepreneur?', Journal of 
Labor Economics, January, 16(1) pp. 26-60. 
  
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (2004), 'Well-being over time in Britain and the 
United States', Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), July, pp. 1359-1386. 
  
  55
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (2005), 'Happiness and the Human Development 
Index: the paradox of Australia', Australian Economic Review, 38(3), September pp. 307-
318. 
 
Blanchflower, D.G., A.J. Oswald and A. Stutzer (2001), ‘Latent entrepreneurship across 
nations,’ European Economic Review, 45(4-6) pp. 680-691, May. 
 
Borjas G.J. (1999), Heaven’s door: immigration policy and the American economy. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey 
 
Borjas, G. J. (2001), ‘Does immigration grease the wheels of the labor market?’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-51. 
 
Borjas, G. J. (2003), 'The labor demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the 
impact of immigration on the labor market', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII (4), 
pp. 1335-1374. 
 
Borjas, G.J. (2005), Labor Economics, 3
rd Edition, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Borjas, G. J. (2006), 'Native internal migration and the labor market impact of 
immigration', Journal of Human Resources, XLI.(2), pp. 221-258. 
 
Borjas, G. J. and L. Katz (2005), 'The Evolution of the Mexican-born workforce in the 
United States', NBER Working paper #11281. 
 
Butcher, K. and Card, D. (1991), 'Immigration and wages: evidence from the 1980s', 
American Economic Review, vol. 81(2), pp. 292–6. 
 
Card, D. (1990), 'The impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market',   
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 43, pp. 245–57. 
 
Card, D. (2001), 'Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local labor market impacts 
of higher immigration', Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), pp. 22-64. 
 
Card, D. (2005), 'Is the new immigration really so bad?', Economic Journal, 115 
(November), F300-F323.   
 
Card, D. and E.G. Lewis (2005), 'The diffusion of Mexican immigrants during the 1990s: 
explanations and impacts', NBER Working paper #11552. 
 
Carrington, W.J. and P.J.F De Lima (1996), 'The impact of 1970s repatriates from Africa 




Chiswick, B. R., and T. J. Hatton (2003), ‘International migration and the integration of 
labor markets,’ in M. D. Bordo, A. M. Taylor, and J. G. Williamson (Eds.), Globalization 
in Historical Perspective, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Constant, A. (2005), 'Immigrant adjustment in France and the impacts on the natives', in 
Zimmermann K.F. (ed), European Migration: What Do We Know? Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Cortes, P. (2006), 'The effect of low-skilled immigration on US prices; evidence from 
CPI data', MIT working paper. 
 
Dench, S., J. Hurstfield, D.Hill, K. Akroyd (2006), Employers’ use of migrant labour, 
Main report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, downloadable at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf 
 
Department of Trade and Industry (2006), Government evidence to the Low Pay 
Commission on the economic effects of the National Minimum Wage, London. 
 
Department of Work and Pensions (2006), 'National Insurance Number allocations to 
overseas nationals entering the UK', London. 
 
Devanzo, J. (1983) 'Repeat migration in the United States: who moves back and who 
moves on?', Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, November, pp. 552-559. 
 
Dickens, R. and M. Draca (2005), ‘The employment effects of the October 2003 increase 
in the National Minimum Wage’, February, Report prepared for the Low Pay 
Commission. 
 
Drinkwater, S., J. Eade and M. Garapich (2006), ‘Poles apart? EU enlargement and the 
labour market outcomes of immigrants in the UK’, IZA Discussion Paper #241, October . 
 
Dustmann, C. (2003), 'Return migration, wage differentials and the optimal migration 
duration', European Economic Review, April, pp. 353-367. 
 
Dustmann, C. and F. Fabbri (2005), 'Immigrants in the British labour market', Fiscal 
Studies, 26(4), pp. 423–470. 
 
Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri and I. Preston (2005), 'The impact of immigration on the British 
labour market', Economic Journal, 115 (November), F324–F341.  
 
European Commission (2006), Report on the Functioning of the Transitional 
Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004–30 April 2006), 
Brussels, 8.2.2006, COM(2006) 48 final. 
  
  57
Eurostat (2006), Population Statistics, 2006 Edition, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
 
Friedberg, R.M. (2001), 'The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, pp. 1373-1408.  
 
Friedberg, R.M. and Hunt, J. (1995), 'The impact of immigration on host country wages, 
employment and growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, pp. 23–44. 
 
Frijters, P., M. A. Shields and S. W. Price (2005), 'Job search methods and their success: 
a comparison of immigrants and natives in the UK', Economic Journal, 115 (November), 
pp. F342–F358 
 
Gilpin, N., M. Henty, S. Lemos, J. Portes and C. Bullen (2006), 'The impact of free 
movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK labour market' 
Department of Work and Pensions, Working paper #29. 
 
Griliches, Z. (1969), ‘Capital skill complementarity’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 51, November, pp. 465-468. 
 
Hatton, T. and M. Tani (2005), 'Immigration and regional mobility in Britain', Economic 
Journal, 115 (November), F342-F358. 
 
Heinz, F.F. and M. Ward-Warmedinger (2006), ‘Cross-border labour mobility within an 
enlarged EU’, October, European Central Bank Occasional Paper No. 52. 
 
Hillier, D. and S. Hayes (2006), 'Immigration and the UK economy', Barclays Capital, 
London. 
 




Hunt, J. (1992), 'The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor 
market, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45, April, pp. 556-572. 
 
International Organisation for Migration (2005), World migration. Costs and benefits of 
international migration, Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Katz, L. and A. Krueger (1999), 'The high pressure US labor market of the 1990s', 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-88. 
 
Krieger, R. (2004), Quality of life in Europe.  Migration trends in an enlarged Europe, 





LaLonde, R., and R. Topel (1997), ‘Economic impact of international migration and the 
economic performance of migrants,’ in M. R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark (Eds.), Handbook 
of Population and Family Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
 
Lewis, E.G. (2006), ‘Immigration, skill mix, and the choice of technique’, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 05-08. 
 
Longhi, S., P. Nijkamp, and J. Poot (2005), 'A meta-analytic assessment of the effect of 
immigration on wages', Journal of Economic Surveys, 19(3), pp. 451–77. 
 
Manacorda, M., A. Manning and J. Wadsworth, (2006), ‘The impact of immigration on 
the structure of male wages: theory and evidence from Britain’, IZA Discussion Paper 
no.2352. 
 
Mühleisen, M. and K.F. Zimmermann (1994), 'A panel analysis of job changes and 
unemployment', European Economic Review, 38 (3-4), pp. 793-801. 
 
Naskoteen, R.A. and M. Zimmer (1980), 'Migration and income; the question of self-
selection', Southern Economic Journal, 46, January, pp. 840-851. 
 
Nickell, S.J. (2006), ‘A picture of European unemployment: success and failure’, in M. 
Werding (ed.), Structural Unemployment in Western Europe, (MIT Press), 2006. 
 
OECD (2006a), International Migration Outlook, Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Paris. 
 
OECD (2006b), Economic Outlook, 80, November, Paris. 
 








Ottaviano, G. and G. Peri (2005), ‘Rethinking the gains from immigration: theory and 
evidence from the US’, NBER Working Paper no. 11672. 
 
Pedersen, P.J. M. Pytlikova and N. Smith (2004), ‘Selection or network effects? 
Migration flows into 27 OECD countries, 1990-2000’, April, IZA Bonn, Discussion 
Paper No 1104. 
 
Pishcke, J. and J. Velling (1997), 'Employment effects of immigration to Germany: an 
analysis based on local labor markets, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 
November, pp. 594-604. 
 
Pope D, and G. Withers (1993) 'Do immigrants rob jobs? Lessons of Australian history, 
1861–1991', Journal of Economic History, 53(4), pp.719–742  
  59
 
Saleheen, J. & C. Shadforth (2006), 'The characteristics of immigrants: a view of the 
data', Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 46(4), pp. 374-385. 
 
Salt, J. and J. Millar (2006), 'Foreign labour in the UK; current patterns and trends', 
Labour Market Trends, 114(10), October, pp. 335-355. 
 
Schiopu, I. and N. Siegfried (2006), ‘Determinants of workers’ remittances. Evidence 
from the European neighbouring region’, European Central Bank Discussion Paper No. 
688, October. 
 
Shimer, R. (1998), 'Why is the US unemployment rate so much lower?'; in B.S. Bernanke 
and J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, NBER. 
 
Staiger, D., J. Stock and M. Watson (1997), ‘The NAIRU, unemployment and monetary 
policy' , Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1), pp. 33-49.  
 
Stewart, M.B. (2004), ‘The employment effects of the National Minimum Wage’, 
Economic Journal, 114(494), C110-116. 
Stewart, M.B. (2002), ‘Estimating the impact of the minimum wage using geographical 
wage variation’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, 64(5), 583-605. 
Welch, F. (1970), ‘Education in production’, Journal of Political Economy, Jan/Feb, 78, 
pp. 35-59. 
 
Winter-Ebmer, R. and J. Zweimüller (1996), 'Immigration and the earnings of young 
native workers', Oxford Economic Papers, 48(3), July, pp. 473-491.  
 
Winter-Ebmer, R. and J. Zweimüller (1999), 'Do immigrants displace young native 
workers: the Austrian experience', Journal of Population Economics, 12, Spring, pp. 327-
340. 
 
World Bank (2007), Development and the Next Generation, World Development Report, 
World Bank, Washington DC.  
 
Yang, D. (2006), ‘Why do migrants return to poor countries? Evidence from Philippine 
migrants' responses to exchange rate shocks’, Review of Economics & Statistics, 
November, 88(4), pp. 715-735.    
 
Zaiceva, A. (2006), ‘Reconciling the estimates of potential migration into the enlarged 
European Union’, IZA Bonn, Discussion Paper No. 2519 
 
Zorlu, A. and J. Hartog (2005), 'The effect of immigration on wages in three European 





                                                 